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Abstract
Decision theory formally solves the problem of rational agents in uncertain worlds
if the true environmental prior probability distribution is known. Solomonoff’s the-
ory of universal induction formally solves the problem of sequence prediction for
unknown prior distribution. We combine both ideas and get a parameterless theory
of universal Artificial Intelligence. We give strong arguments that the resulting AIξ
model is the most intelligent unbiased agent possible. We outline for a number of
problem classes, including sequence prediction, strategic games, function minimiza-
tion, reinforcement and supervised learning, how the AIξ model can formally solve
them. The major drawback of the AIξ model is that it is uncomputable. To over-
come this problem, we construct a modified algorithm AIξtl, which is still effectively
more intelligent than any other time t and space l bounded agent. The computation
time of AIξtl is of the order t ·2l. Other discussed topics are formal definitions of
intelligence order relations, the horizon problem and relations of the AIξ theory to
other AI approaches.
1Any response to marcus@hutter1.de is welcome.
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1 Introduction
Artificial Intelligence: The science of Artificial Intelligence (AI) might be defined
as the construction of intelligent systems and their analysis. A natural definition of
systems is anything which has an input and an output stream. Intelligence is more
complicated. It can have many faces like creativity, solving problems, pattern recognition,
classification, learning, induction, deduction, building analogies, optimization, surviving
in an environment, language processing, knowledge and many more. A formal definition
incorporating every aspect of intelligence, however, seems difficult. Further, intelligence
is graded, there is a smooth transition between systems, which everyone would agree
to be not intelligent and truely intelligent systems. One simply has to look in nature,
starting with, for instance, inanimate crystals, then come amino-acids, then some RNA
fragments, then viruses, bacteria, plants, animals, apes, followed by the truly intelligent
homo sapiens, and possibly continued by AI systems or ET’s. So the best we can expect
to find is a partial or total order relation on the set of systems, which orders them w.r.t.
their degree of intelligence (like intelligence tests do for human systems, but for a limited
class of problems). Having this order we are, of course, are interested in large elements,
i.e. highly intelligent systems. If a largest element exists, it would correspond to the most
intelligent system which could exist.
Most, if not all known facets of intelligence can be formulated as goal driven or, more
precisely, as maximizing some utility function. It is, therefore, sufficient to study goal
driven AI. E.g. the (biological) goal of animals and humans is to survive and spread.
The goal of AI systems should be to be useful to humans. The problem is that, except
for special cases, we know neither the utility function, nor the environment in which the
system will operate, in advance.
Main idea: We propose a theory which formally2 solves the problem of unknown goal
and environment. It might be viewed as a unification of the ideas of universal induction,
probabilistic planning and reinforcement learning or as a unification of sequential decision
theory with algorithmic information theory. We apply this model to some of the facets
of intelligence, including induction, game playing, optimization, reinforcement and super-
vised learning, and show how it solves these problem classes. This, together with general
convergence theorems motivates us to believe that the constructed universal AI system
is the best one in a sense to be clarified in the sequel, i.e. that it is the most intelligent
environmental independent system possible. The intention of this work is to introduce
the universal AI model and give an in breadth analysis. Most arguments and proofs are
succinct and require slow reading or some additional pencil work.
Contents: Section 2: The general framework for AI might be viewed as the design and
study of intelligent agents [31]. An agent is a cybernetic system with some internal state,
which acts with output yk to some environment in cycle k, perceives some input xk from
2With a formal solution we mean a rigorous mathematically definition, uniquely specifying the solution.
In the following, a solution is always meant in this formal sense.
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the environment and updates its internal state. Then the next cycle follows. It operates
according to some function p. We split the input xk into a regular part x
′
k and a credit
ck, often called reinforcement feedback. From time to time the environment provides
non-zero credit to the system. The task of the system is to maximize its utility, defined as
the sum of future credits. A probabilistic environment is a probability distribution µ(q)
over deterministic environments q. Most, if not all environments are of this type. We
give a formal expression for the function p∗, which maximizes in every cycle the total µ
expected future credit. This model is called the AIµ model. As every AI problem can be
brought into this form, the problem of maximizing utility is hence being formally solved,
if µ is known. There is nothing remarkable or new here, it is the essence of sequential
decision theory [6, 27, 40]. Notation and formulas needed in later sections are simply
developed. There are two major remaining problems. The problem of the unknown true
prior probability µ is solved in section 4. Computational aspects are addressed in section
10.
Section 3: Instead of talking about probability distributions µ(q) over functions, one could
describe the environment by the conditional probability of providing inputs x1...xn to the
system under the condition that the system outputs y1...yn. The definition of the optimal
p∗ system in this iterative form is shown to be equivalent to the previous functional form.
The functional form is more elegant and will be used to define an intelligence order relation
and the time-bounded model in section 10. The iterative form is more index intensive but
more suitable for explicit calculations and is used in most of the other sections. Further,
we introduce factorizable probability distributions.
Section 4: A special topic is the theory of induction. In which sense prediction of the
future is possible at all, is best summarized by the theory of Solomonoff. Given the initial
binary sequence x1...xk, what is the probability of the next bit being 1? It can be fairly well
predicted by using a universal probability distribution ξ invented and shown to converge to
the true prior probability µ by Solomonoff [35, 36] as long as µ (which needs not be known!)
is computable. The problem of unknown µ is hence solved for induction problems. All AI
problems where the systems’ output does not influence the environment, i.e. all passive
systems are of this inductive form. Besides sequence prediction (SP), classification(CF)
is also of this type. Active systems, like game playing (SG) and optimization (FM), can
not be reduced to induction systems. The main idea of this work is to generalize
universal induction to the general cybernetic model described in sections 2 and 3. For
this, we generalize ξ to include conditions and replace µ by ξ in the rational agent model.
In this way the problem that the true prior probability µ is usually unknown is solved.
Universality of ξ and convergence of ξ→ µ will be shown. These are strong arguments
for the optimality of the resulting AIξ model. There are certain difficulties in proving
rigorously that and in which sense it is optimal, i.e. the most intelligent system. Further,
we introduce a universal order relation for intelligence.
Sections 5–9 show how a number of AI problem classes fit into the general AIξ model. All
these problems are formally solved by the AIξ model. The solution is, however, only formal
because the AIξ model developed thus far is uncomputable or, at best, approximable.
These sections should support the claim that every AI problem can be formulated (and
hence solved) within the AIξ model. For some classes we give concrete examples to
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illuminate the scope of the problem class. We first formulate each problem class in its
natural way (when µproblem is known) and then construct a formulation within the AIµ
model and prove its equivalence. We then consider the consequences of replacing µ by ξ.
The main goal is to understand why and how the problems are solved by AIξ. We only
highlight special aspects of each problem class. Sections 5–9 together should give a better
picture of the AIξ model. We do not study every aspect for every problem class. The
sections might be read selectively. They are not necessary to understand the remaining
sections.
Section 5: Using the AIµ model for sequence prediction (SP) is identical to Baysian
sequence prediction SPΘµ. One might expect, when using the AIξ model for sequence
prediction, one would recover exactly the universal sequence prediction scheme SPΘξ, as
AIξ was a unification of the AIµ model and the idea of universal probability ξ. Unfor-
tunately this is not the case. One reason is that ξ is only a probability distribution in
the inputs x and not in the outputs y. This is also one of the origins of the difficulty
of proving error/credit bounds for AIξ. Nevertheless, we argue that AIξ is equally well
suited for sequence prediction as SPΘξ is. In a very limited setting we prove a (weak)
error bound for AIξ which gives hope that a general proof is attainable.
Section 6: A very important class of problems are strategic games (SG). We restrict our-
selves to deterministic strictly competitive strategic games like chess. If the environment
is a minimax player, the AIµ model itself reduces to a minimax strategy. Repeated games
of fixed lengths are a special case for factorizable µ. The consequences of variable game
length is sketched. The AIξ model has to learn the rules of the game under consideration,
as it has no prior information about these rules. We describe how AIξ actually learns
these rules.
Section 7: There are many problems that fall into the category ’resource bounded function
minimization’ (FM). They include the Traveling Salesman Problem, minimizing produc-
tion costs, inventing new materials or even producing, e.g. nice paintings, which are
(subjectively) judged by a human. The task is to (approximately) minimize some func-
tion f :Y →Z within minimal number of function calls. We will see that a greedy model
trying to minimize f in every cycle fails. Although the greedy model has nothing to
do with downhill or gradient techniques (there is nothing like a gradient or direction for
functions over Y ) which are known to fail, we discover the same difficulties. FM has
already nearly the full complexity of general AI. The reason being that FM can actively
influence the information gathering process by its trials yk (whereas SP and CF cannot).
We discuss in detail the optimal FMµ model and its inventiveness in choosing the y∈Y .
A discussion of the subtleties when using AIξ for function minimization, follows.
Section 8: Reinforcement learning, as the AIξ model does, is an important learning tech-
nique but not the only one. To improve the speed of learning, supervised learning, i.e.
learning by acquiring knowledge, or learning from a constructive teacher is necessary. We
show, how AIξ learns to learn supervised. It actually establishes supervised learning very
quickly within O(1) cycles.
Section 9 gives a brief survey of other general aspects, ideas and methods in AI, and their
connection to the AIξ model. Some aspects are directly included, others are or should be
emergent.
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Section 10: Up to now we have shown the universal character of the AIξ model but have
completely ignored computational aspects. Let us assume that there exists some algorithm
p˜ of size l˜ with computation time per cycle t˜, which behaves in a sufficiently intelligent
way (this assumption is the very basis of AI). The algorithm p∗ should run all algorithms
of length ≤ l˜ for t˜ time steps in every cycle and select the best output among them. So we
have an algorithm which runs in time l˜·2t˜ and is at least as good as p˜, i.e. it also serves our
needs apart from the (very large but) constant multiplicative factor in computation time.
This idea of the ’typing monkeys’, one of them eventually producing ’Shakespeare’, is well
known and widely used in theoretical computer science. The difficult part is the selection
of the algorithm with the best output. A further complication is that the selection process
itself must have only limited computation time. We present a suitable modification of
the AIξ model which solves these difficult problems. The solution is somewhat involved
from an implementational aspect. An implementation would include first order logic, the
definition of a Universal Turing machine within it and proof theory. The assumptions
behind this construction are discussed at the end.
Section 11 contains some discussion of otherwise unmentioned topics and some (personal)
remarks. It also serves as an outlook to further research.
Section 12 contains the conclusions.
History & References: Kolmogorov65 [17] suggested to define the information content
of an object as the length of the shortest program computing a representation of it.
Solomonoff64 [35] invented the closely related universal prior probability distribution and
used it for binary sequence prediction [35, 36] and function inversion and minimization
[37]. Together with Chaitin66&75 [3, 4] this was the invention of what is now called
Algorithmic Information theory. For further literature and many applications see [24].
Other interesting ’applications’ can be found in [5, 34, 43]. Related topics are the Weighted
Majority Algorithm invented by Littlestone and Warmuth89 [20], universal forecasting by
Vovk92 [42], Levin search73 [18], pac-learning introduced by Valiant84 [41] and Minimum
Description Length [22, 30]. Resource bounded complexity is discussed in [8, 9, 16, 29],
resource bounded universal probability in [21, 24]. Implementations are rare [7, 32, 33].
Excellent reviews with a philosophical touch are [23, 38]. For an older, but general review
of inductive inference see Angluin83 [1]. For an excellent introduction into algorithmic
information theory, further literature and many applications one should consult the book
of Li and Vita´nyi97 [24]. The survey [22] or the chapters 4 and 5 of [24] should be
sufficient to follow the arguments and proofs in this paper. The other ingredient in our
AIξ model is sequential decision theory. We do not need much more than the maximum
expected utility principle and the expecimax algorithm [25, 31]. The book of von Neumann
and Morgenstern44 [40] might be seen as the initiation of game theory, which already
contains the expectimax algorithm as a special case. The literature on decision theory
is vast and we only give two possibly interesting references with regard to this paper.
Cheeseman85&88 [6] is a defense of the use of probability theory in AI. Pearl88 [27] is a
good introduction and overview of probabilistic reasoning.
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2 The AIµ Model in Functional Form
The cybernetic or agent model: A good way to start thinking about intelligent
systems is to consider more generally cybernetic systems, in AI usually called agents.
This avoids having to struggle with the meaning of intelligence from the very beginning.
A cybernetic system is a control circuit with input y and output x and an internal state.
From an external input and the internal state the system calculates deterministically or
stochastically an output. This output (action) modifies the environment and leads to a
new input (reception). This continues ad infinitum or for a finite number of cycles. As
explained in the last section, we need some credit assignment to the cybernetic system.
The input x is divided into two parts, the standard input x′ and some credit input c.
If input and output are represented by strings, a deterministic cybernetic system can be
modeled by a Turing machine p. p is called the policy of the agent, which determines
the action to a receipt. If the environment is also computable it might be modeled by
a Turing machine q as well. The interaction of the agent with the environment can be
illustrated as follows:
c1 x′1 c2 x
′
2
c3 x′3 c4 x
′
4
c5 x′5 c6 x
′
6
...
y1 y2 y3 y4 y5 y6 ...
working
System
p
tape ... working
Environ−
ment q
tape ...







) P
P
P
P
P
P
P
PPi







1PP
P
P
P
P
P
Pq
p as well as q have unidirectional input and output tapes and bidirectional working tapes.
What entangles the agent with the environment, is the fact that the upper tape serves as
input tape for p, as well as output tape for q, and that the lower tape serves as output
tape for p as well as input tape for q. Further, the reading head must always be left of the
writing head, i.e. the symbols must first be written, before they are read. p and q have
their own mutually inaccessible working tapes containing their own ’secrets’. The heads
move in the following way. In the kth cycle p writes yk, q reads yk, q writes xk ≡ ckx′k,
p reads xk ≡ ckx′k, followed by the (k + 1)th cycle and so on. The whole process starts
with the first cycle, all heads on tape start and working tapes being empty. We want
to call Turing machines behaving in this way, chronological Turing machines, for obvious
reasons. Before continuing, some notations on strings are appropriate.
Strings: We will denote strings over the alphabet X by s = x1x2...xn, with xk ∈ X,
where X is alternatively interpreted as a non-empty subset of IN or itself as a prefix free
set of binary strings. l(s) = l(x1)+ ...+l(xn) is the length of s. Analogous definitions hold
for yk∈Y . We call xk the kth input word and yk the kth output word (rather than letter).
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The string s = y1x1...ynxn represents the input/output in chronological order. Due to the
prefix property of the xk and yk, s can be uniquely separated into its words. The words
appearing in strings are always in chronological order. We further introduce the following
abbreviations: ǫ is the empty string, xn:m := xnxn+1...xm−1xm for n ≤ m and ǫ for n > m.
x<n := x1...xn−1. Analog for y. Further, yxn := ynxn, yxn:m :=ynxn...ymxm, and so on.
AI model for known deterministic environment: Let us define for the chronolog-
ical Turing machine p a partial function also named p :X∗→Y ∗ with y1:k = p(x<k) where
y1:k is the output of Turing machine p on input x<k in cycle k, i.e. where p has read up to
xk−1 but no further. In an analogous way, we define q :Y ∗→X∗ with x1:k = q(y1:k). Con-
versely, for every partial recursive chronological function we can define a corresponding
chronological Turing machine. Each (system,environment) pair (p, q) produces a unique
I/O sequence ω(p, q) := ypq1 x
pq
1 y
pq
2 x
pq
2 .... When we look at the definition of p and q we see a
nice symmetry between the cybernetic system and the environment. Until now, not much
intelligence is in our system. Now the credit assignment comes into the game and removes
the symmetry somewhat. We split the input xk∈X :=C×X ′ into a regular part x′k∈X ′
and a credit ck ∈ C ⊂ IR. We define xk ≡ ckx′k and ck ≡ c(xk). The goal of the system
should be to maximize received credits. This is called reinforcement learning. The reason
for the asymmetry is, that eventually we (humans) will be the environment with which
the system will communicate and we want to dictate what is good and what is wrong,
not the other way round. This one way learning, the system learns from the environment,
and not conversely, neither prevents the system from becoming more intelligent than the
environment, nor does it prevent the environment learning from the system because the
environment can itself interpret the outputs yk as a regular and a credit part. The envi-
ronment is just not forced to learn, whereas the system is. In cases where we restrict the
credit to two values c∈C= IB :={0, 1}, c=1 is interpreted as a positive feedback, called
good or correct and c=0 a negative feedback, called bad or error in the following. Further,
let us restrict for a while the lifetime (number of cycles) T of the system to a large, but
finite value. Let Ckm(p, q) :=
∑m
i=k c(xi) be the total credit, the system p receives from the
environment q in the cycles k to m. It is now natural to call the system, which maximizes
the total credit C1T , called utility, the best or most intelligent one
3.
p∗,T,q = maxarg
p
C1T (p, q) ⇒ CkT (p∗,T,q, q) ≥ CkT (p, q) ∀p
For k=1 this is obvious and for k>1 easy to see. If T , Y and X are finite, the number of
different behaviours of the system, i.e. the search space is finite. Therefore, because we
have assumed that q is known, p∗,T,q can effectively be determined (by pre-analyzing all
behaviours). The main reason for restricting to finite T was not to ensure computability of
p∗,T,q but that the limit T→∞ might not exist. This is nothing special, the (unrealistic)
assumption of a completely known deterministic environment q has simply trivialized
everything.
3maxargpC(p) is the p which maximizes C(·). If there is more than one maximum we might choose
the lexicographically smallest one for definiteness.
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AI model for known prior probability: Let us now weaken our assumptions by
replacing the environment q with a probability distribution µ(q) over chronological func-
tions. µ might be interpreted in two ways. Either the environment itself behaves in a
probabilistic way defined by µ or the true environment is deterministic, but we only have
probabilistic information, of which environment being the true environment. Combina-
tions of both cases are also possible. The interpretation does not matter in the following.
We just assume that we know µ but no more about the environment whatever the inter-
pretation may be.
Let us assume we are in cycle k with history y˙x˙1...y˙x˙k−1 and ask for the best output yk.
Further, let Q˙k :={q : q(y˙<k) = x˙<k} be the set of all environments producing the above
history. The expected credit for the next m−k+1 cycles (given the above history) is given
by a conditional probability:
Cµkm(p|y˙x˙<k) :=
∑
q∈Q˙k µ(q)Ckm(p, q)∑
q∈Q˙k µ(q)
. (1)
We cannot simply determine maxargp(C1T ) unlike the deterministic case because the
history is no longer deterministically determined by p and q, but depends on p and µ
and on the outcome of a stochastic process. Every new cycle adds new information (x˙i)
to the system. This is indicated by the dots over the symbols. In cycle k we have to
maximize the expected future credit, taking into account the information in the history
y˙x˙<k. This information is not already present in p and q/µ at the system’s start unlike in
the deterministic case.
Further, we want to generalize the finite lifetime T to a dynamical (computable) farsight-
edness hk≡mk−k+1≥1, called horizon in the following. For mk=T we have our original
finite lifetime, for mk=k+m−1 the system maximizes in every cycle the next m expected
credits. A discussion of the choices mk is delayed to section 4.
The next hk credits are maximized by
p∗k := maxarg
p∈P˙k
Cµkmk(p|y˙x˙<k),
where P˙k :={p : p(x˙<k) = y˙<k∗} is the set of systems consistent with the current history.
p∗k depends on k and is used only in step k to determine y˙k by p
∗
k(x˙<k; y˙<k)= y˙<ky˙k. After
writing y˙k the environment replies with x˙k with (conditional) probability µ(Q˙k+1)/µ(Q˙k).
This probabilistic outcome provides new information to the system. The cycle k+1 starts
with determining y˙k+1 from p
∗
k+1 (which differs from pk as x˙k is now fixed) and so on.
Note that p∗k depends also on y˙<k because P˙k and Q˙k do so. But recursively inserting p
∗
k−1
and so on, we can define
p∗(x˙<k) := p∗k(x˙<k; p
∗
k−1(x˙<k−1...p
∗
1))) (2)
It is a chronological function and computable if X, Y and mk are finite. The policy p
∗
defines our AIµ model. For deterministic4 µ this model reduces to the deterministic case.
4We call a probability distribution deterministic if it is 1 for exactly one argument and 0 for all others.
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It is important to maximize the sum of future credits and not, for instance, to be greedy
and only maximize the next credit, as is done e.g. in sequence prediction. For example,
let the environment be a sequence of chess games and each cycle corresponds to one move.
Only at the end of each game a positive credit c=1 is given to the system if it won the
game (and made no illegal move). For the system, maximizing all future credits means
trying to win as many games in as short as possible time (and avoiding illegal moves).
The same performance is reached, if we choose mk=k+m with m much larger than the
typical game lengths. Maximization of only the next credit would be a very bad chess
playing system. Even if we would make our credit c finer, e.g. by evaluating the number
of chessmen, the system would play very bad chess for m=1, indeed.
The AIµ model still depends on µ and mk. mk is addressed in section 4. To get our final
universal AI model the idea is to replace µ by the universal probability ξ, defined later.
This is motivated by the fact that ξ→µ in a certain sense for any µ. With ξ instead of
µ our model no longer depends on any parameters, so it is truly universal. It remains to
show that it produces intelligent outputs. But let us continue step by step. In the next
section we develop an alternative but equivalent formulation of the AI model given above.
Whereas the functional form is more suitable for theoretical considerations, especially for
the development of a timebounded version in section 10, the iterative formulation of the
next section will be more appropriate for the explicit calculations in most of the other
sections.
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3 The AIµ Model in Recursive and Iterative Form
Probability distributions: Throughout the paper we deal with sequences/strings and
conditional probability distributions on strings. Some notations are therefore appropriate.
We use Greek letters for probability distributions and underline their arguments to indi-
cate that they are probability arguments. Let ρn(x1...xn) be the probability that a string
starts with x1...xn. We only consider sufficiently long strings, so the ρn are normalized to
1. Moreover, we drop the index on ρ if it is clear from its arguments:∑
xn∈X
ρ(x1:n) ≡
∑
xn
ρn(x1:n) = ρn−1(x<n) ≡ ρ(x<n), ρ(ǫ) ≡ ρ0(ǫ) = 1. (3)
We also need conditional probabilities derived from Bayes’ rule. We prefer a notation
which preserves the chronological order of the words, in contrast to the standard notation
ρ(·|·) which flips it. We extend the definition of ρ to the conditional case with the following
convention for its arguments: An underlined argument xk is a probability variable and
other non-underlined arguments xk represent conditions. With this convention, Bayes’
rule has the form ρ(x<nxn) = ρ(x1:n)/ρ(x<n). The equation states that the probability
that a string x1...xn−1 is followed by xn is equal to the probability of x1...xn∗ divided by
the probability of x1...xn−1∗. We use x∗ as a shortcut for ’strings starting with x’.
The introduced notation is also suitable for defining the conditional probability
ρ(y1x1...ynxn) that the environment reacts with x1...xn under the condition that the out-
put of the system is y1...yn. The environment is chronological, i.e. input xi depends
on yx<iyi only. In the probabilistic case this means that ρ(yx<kyk) :=
∑
xk ρ(yx1:k) is in-
dependent of yk, hence a tailing yk in the arguments of ρ can be dropped. Probability
distributions with this property will be called chronological. The y are always conditions,
i.e. never underlined, whereas additional conditioning for the x can be obtained with
Bayes’ rule
ρ(yx<nyxn) = ρ(yx1:n)/ρ(yx<n) and
ρ(yx1:n) = ρ(yx1)·ρ(yx1yx2)· ... ·ρ(yx<nyxn)
(4)
The second equation is the first equation applied n times.
Alternative Formulation of the AIµ Model: Let us define the AIµ model p∗ in
a different way. In the next subsection we will show that the p∗ model defined here is
identical to the functional definition of p∗ given in the last section.
Let µ(yx1:k) be the true chronological prior probability that the environment reacts with
x1:k if provided with actions y1:k from the system. We assume the cybernetic model
depicted on page 7 to be valid. Next we define C∗k+1,m(yx1:k) to be the µ expected credit
sum in cycles k+1 to m with outputs yi generated by system p
∗ and past responses xi
from the environment. Adding c(xk) we get the credit including cycle k. The probability
of xk, given yx<kyk, is given by the condition probability µ(yx<kyxk). So the expected
credit sum in cycles k to m given yx<kyk is
C∗km(yx<kyk) :=
∑
xk
[c(xk) + C
∗
k+1,m(yx1:k)]·µ(yx<kyxk) (5)
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Now we ask about how p∗ chooses yk. It should choose yk as to maximize the future
credit. So the expected number of errors in cycles k to m given yx<k and yk chosen by p
∗
is C∗km(yx<k) :=maxyk C
∗
km(yx<kyk). Together with the induction start
C∗m+1,m(yx1:m) := 0 (6)
Ckm is completely defined. We might summarize one cycle into the formula
C∗km(yx<k) = maxyk
∑
xk
[c(xk) + C
∗
k+1,m(yx1:k)]·µ(yx<kyxk) (7)
If mk is our horizon function of p
∗ and y˙x˙<k is the actual history in cycle k, the output
y˙k of the system is explicitly given by
y˙k = maxarg
yk
C∗kmk(y˙x˙<kyk) =: p
∗(y˙x˙<k) (8)
Then the environment responds x˙k with probability µ(y˙x˙<ky˙x˙k). Then cycle k+1 starts.
We might unfold the recursion (7) further and give y˙k non-recursive as
y˙k = maxarg
yk
∑
xk
max
yk+1
∑
xk+1
... max
ymk
∑
xmk
(c(xk)+ ... +c(xmk))·µ(y˙x˙<kyxk:mk) (9)
This has a direct interpretation: the probability of inputs xk:mk in cycle k when the system
outputs yk:mk and the actual history is y˙x˙<k is µ(y˙x˙<kyxk:mk). The future credit in this
case is c(xk)+ ... +c(xmk). The best expected credit is obtained by averaging over the
xi (sumxi) and maximizing over the yi. This has to be done in chronological order to
correctly incorporate the dependency of xi and yi on the history. This is essentially the
expectimax algorithm/sequence [25, 31]. The AIµ model is optimal in the sense that no
other policy leads to higher expected credit.
These explicit as well as recursive definitions of the AIµ model are more index intensive
as compared to the functional form but are more suitable for explicit calculations.
Equivalence of Functional and Iterative AI model: The iterative environmental
probability µ is given by the functional form in the following way,
µ(yx1:k) =
∑
q:q(y1:k)=x1:k
µ(q) (10)
as is easy to see. We will prove the equivalence of (2) and (8) only for k=2 and m2=3.
The proof of the general case is completely analog except that the notation becomes quite
messy.
Let us first evaluate (1) for fixed y˙1x˙1 and some p ∈ P˙2, i.e. p(x˙1) = y˙1y2 for some y2.
If the next input to the system is x2, p will respond with p(x˙1x2) = y˙1y2y3 for some y3
depending on x2. We write y3(x2) in the following
5. The numerator of (1) simplifies to∑
q∈Q˙2
µ(q)C23(p, q) =
∑
q:q(y˙1)=x˙1
µ(q)C23(p, q) =
∑
x2x3
(c(x2)+c(x3))
∑
q:q(y˙1y2y3(x2))=x˙1x2x3
µ(q) =
5Dependency on dotted words like x˙1 is not shown as the dotted words are fixed.
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=
∑
x2x3
(c(x2)+c(x3))·µ(y˙1x˙1y2x2y3(x2)x3)
In the first equality we inserted the definition of Q˙2. In the second equality we split the
sum over q by first summing over q with fixed x2x3. This allows us to pull C23= c(x2)+c(x3)
out of the inner sum. Then we sum over x2x3. Further, we have inserted p, i.e. replaced
p by y2 and y3(·). In the last equality we used (10). The denominator reduces to∑
q∈Q˙2
µ(q) =
∑
q:q(y˙1)=x˙1
µ(q) = µ(y˙1x˙1).
For the quotient we get
C23(p|y˙1x˙1) =
∑
x2x3
(c(x2)+c(x3))·µ(y˙1x˙1y2x2y3(x2)x3)
We have seen that the relevant behaviour of p∈ P˙2 in cycle 2 and 3 is completely deter-
mined by y2 and the function y3(·)
max
p∈P˙2
C23(p|y˙1x˙1) = max
y2
max
y3(·)
∑
x2x3
(c(x2)+c(x3))·µ(y˙1x˙1y2x2y3(x2)c3) =
= max
y2
∑
x2
max
y3
∑
x3
(c(x2)+c(x3))·µ(y˙1x˙1y2x2y3x3)
In the last equality we have used the fact that the functional minimization over y3(·)
reduces to a simple minimization over the word y3 when interchanging with the sum
over its arguments (maxy3(·)
∑
x2 ≡
∑
x2 maxy3). In the functional case y˙2 is therefore
determined by
y˙2 = maxarg
y2
∑
x2
max
y3
∑
x3
(c(x2)+c(x3))·µ(y˙1x˙1y2x2y3x3)
This is identical to the iterative definition (9) with k=2 and m2=3 ⊓⊔.
Factorizable µ: Up to now we have made no restrictions on the form of the prior
probability µ apart from being a chronological probability distribution. On the other
hand, we will see that, in order to prove rigorous credit bounds, the prior probability
must satisfy some separability condition to be defined later. Here we introduce some very
strong form of separability, when µ factorizes into products. We start with a factorization
into two factors. Let us assume that µ is of the form
µ(yx1:n) = µ1(yx<l) · µ2(yxl:n) (11)
for some fixed l and sufficiently large n≥mk. For this µ the output y˙k in cycle k of the
AIµ system (9) for k≥ l depends on y˙x˙l:k−1 and µ2 only and is independent of y˙x˙<l and
µ1. This is easily seen when inserting
µ(y˙x˙<kyxk:mk) = µ1(y˙x˙<l)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡1
·µ2(y˙x˙l:k−1yxk:mk) (12)
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into (9). For k < l the output y˙k depends on y˙x˙<k (this is trivial) and µ1 only (trivial if
mk<l) and is independent of µ2. The non-trivial case, where the horizon mk≥ l reaches
into the region µ2, can be proved as follows (we abbreviate m :=mk in the following).
Inserting (11) into the definition of C∗lm(yx<l) the factor µ1 is 1 as in (12). We abbreviate
C∗lm :=C
∗
lm(yx<l) as it is independent of its arguments. One can decompose
C∗km(yx<k) = C
∗
k,l−1(yx<k) + C
∗
lm (13)
For k= l this is true because the first term on the r.h.s. is zero. For k < l we prove the
decomposition by induction from k+1 to k.
C∗km(yx<k) = maxyk
∑
xk
[c(xk) + C
∗
k+1,l−1(yx1:k) + C
∗
lm]·µ1(yx<kyxk) =
= max
yk
[∑
xk
(c(xk) + C
∗
k+1,l−1(yx<k))·µ1(yx<kyxk) + C∗lm
]
=
= C∗k,l−1(yx<k) + C
∗
lm
Inserting (13), valid for k by induction hypothesis, into (7) gives the first equality. In
the second equality we have performed the xk sum for the C
∗
lm ·µ1 term which is now
independent of yk. It can therefore be pulled out of maxyk . In the last equality we used
again the definition (7). This completes the induction step and proves (13) for k< l. y˙k
can now be represented as
y˙k = maxarg
yk
C∗km(y˙x˙<kyk) = maxarg
yk
C∗k,l−1(y˙x˙<kyk) (14)
where (8) and (13) and the fact that an additive constant C∗lm does not change maxargyk
has been used. C∗k,l−1(y˙x˙<kyk) and hence y˙k is independent of µ2 for k< l. Note, that y˙k
is also independent of the choice of m, as long as m≥ l.
In the general case the cycles are grouped into independent episodes r=1, 2, 3, ..., where
each episode r consists of the cycles k=nr+1, ..., nr+1 for some 0 = n0 < n1 < ... < ns = n:
µ(yx1:n) =
s−1∏
r=0
µr(yxnr+1:nr+1) (15)
In the simplest case, when all episodes have the same length l then nr = r·l. y˙k depends
on µr and x and y of episode r only, with r such that nr<k≤nr+1.
y˙k = maxarg
yk
∑
xk
...max
yt
∑
xt
(c(xk)+ ... +c(xt))·µr(y˙x˙nr+1:k−1yxk:nr+1) (16)
with t :=min{mk, nr+1}. The different episodes are completely independent in the follow-
ing sense. The inputs xk of different episodes are statistically independent and depend
only on yk of the same episode. The outputs yk depend on the x and y of the corresponding
episode r only, and are independent of the actual I/O of the other episodes.
If all episodes have a length of at most l, i.e. nr+1−nr≤ l and if we choose the horizon
hk to be at least l, then mk≥ k+l−1≥nr+l≥nr+1 and hence t = nr+1 independent of
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mk. This means that for factorizable µ there is no problem in taking the limit mk→∞.
Maybe this limit can also be performed in the more general case of a separable µ. The
(problem of the) choice of mk will be discussed in more detail later.
Although factorizable µ are too restrictive to cover all AI problems, it often occurs in
practice in the form of repeated problem solving, and hence, is worth being studied. For
example, if the system has to play games like chess repeatedly, or has to minimize dif-
ferent functions, the different games/functions might be completely independent, i.e. the
environmental probability factorizes, where each factor corresponds to a game/function
minimization. For details, see the appropriate sections on strategic games and function
minimization.
Further, for factorizable µ it is probably easier to derive suitable credit bounds for the
universal AIξ model defined in the next section, than for the general separable case which
will be introduced later. This could be a first step toward a definition and proof for the
general case of separable problems. One goal of this paragraph was to show, that the
notion of a factorizable µ could be the first step toward a definition and analysis of the
general case of separable µ.
Constants and Limits: We have in mind a universal system with complex interactions
that is as least as intelligent and complex as a human being. One might think of a system
whose input yk comes from a digital video camera, the output xk is some image to a
monitor6, only for the valuation we might restrict to the most primitive binary one, i.e.
ck∈ IB. So we think of the following constant sizes:
1 ≪ 〈l(ykxk)〉 ≪ k ≤ T ≪ |Y ×X|
1 ≪ 216 ≪ 224 ≤ 232 ≪ 265536
The first two limits say that the actual number k of inputs/outputs should be reasonably
large, compared to the typical size 〈l〉 of the input/output words, which itself should be
rather sizeable. The last limit expresses the fact that the total lifetime T (number of I/O
cycles) of the system is far too small to allow every possible input to occur, or to try
every possible output, or to make use of identically repeated inputs or outputs. We do
not expect any useful outputs for k ≤ 〈l〉. More interesting than the lengths of the inputs
is the complexity K(x1...xk) of all inputs until now, to be defined later. The environment
is usually not ”perfect”. The system could either interact with a non-perfect human or
tackle a non-deterministic world (due to quantum mechanics or chaos) world7. In either
case, the sequence contains some noise, leading to K ∼ 〈l〉 ·k. The complexity of the
probability distribution of the input sequence is something different. We assume that
this noisy world operates according to some simple computable, though not finite rules.
K(µk)≪ 〈l〉·k, i.e. the rules of the world can be highly compressed. On the other hand,
there may appear new aspects of the environment for k → ∞ causing a non-bounded
K(µk).
6Humans can only simulate a screen as output device by drawing pictures.
7Whether there exist stochastic processes at all is a difficult question. At least the quantum indeter-
minacy comes very close to it.
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In the following we never use these limits, except when explicitly stated. In some simpler
models and examples the size of the constants will even violate these limits (e.g. l(xk) =
l(yk) = 1), but it is the limits above that the reader should bear in mind. We are only
interested in theorems which do not degenerate under the above limits.
Sequential decision theory: In the following we clarify the connection of (7) and (8) to
sequential decision theory and discuss similarities and differences. With probability Maij,
the system under consideration should reach (environmental) state i ∈ S when taking
action a∈A depending on the current state j∈S. If the system receives reward R(i), the
optimal policy p∗, maximizing expected utility (defined as sum of future rewards), and
the utility U(i) of policy p∗ are
p∗(i) = maxarg
a
∑
j
MaijU(j) , U(i) = R(i) + maxa
∑
j
MaijU(j) (17)
See [31] for details and further references. Let us identify
S = (Y ×X)∗, A = Y, a = yk, Maij = µ(yx<kyxk),
i = yx<k, R(i) = c(xk−1), U(i) = C∗k−1,m(yx<k) = c(xk−1) + C
∗
km(yx<k),
j = yx1:k, R(j) = c(xk), U(j) = C
∗
km(yx1:k) = c(xk) + C
∗
k+1,m(yx1:k),
where we further set Maij = 0 if i is not a starting substring of j or if a 6= yk. This
ensures the sum over j in (17) to reduce to a sum over xk. If we set mk =m and use
C∗km(yx<kyk)=
∑
xk C
∗
km(yx1:k) in (8), it is easy to see that (17) coincides with (7) and (8).
Note that despite of this formal equivalence, we were forced to use the complete history
yx<k as environmental state i. The AIµ model neither assumes stationarity, nor Markov
property, nor complete accessibility of the environment, as any assumption would restrict
the applicability of AIµ. The consequence is that every state occurs at most once in
the lifetime of the system. Every moment in the universe is unique! Even if the state
space could be identified with the input space X, inputs would usually not occur twice by
assumption k≪|X|, made in the last subsection. Further, there is no (obvious) universal
similarity relation on (X×Y )∗ allowing an effective reduction of the size of the state space.
Although many algorithms (e.g. value and policy iteration) have problems in solving (17)
for huge or infinite state spaces in practice, there is no principle problem in determining
p∗ and U , as long as µ is known and |X|, |Y | and m are finite.
Things dramatically change if µ is unknown. Reinforcement learning algorithms [15] are
commonly used in this case to learn the unknown µ. They succeed if the state space
is either small or has effectively been made small by so called generalization techniques.
In any case, the solutions are either ad hoc, or work in restricted domains only, or have
serious problems with state space exploration versus exploitation, or have non-optimal
learning rate. There is no universal and optimal solution to this problem so far. In the
next section we present a new model and argue that it formally solves all these problems
in an optimal way. It will not concern with learning of µ directly. All we do is to replace
the true prior probability µ by a universal probability ξ, which is shown to converge to µ
in a sense.
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4 The Universal AIξ Model
Induction and Algorithmic Information theory: One very important and highly
non-trivial aspect of intelligence is inductive inference. Before formulating the AIξ model,
a short introduction to the history of induction is given, culminating into the sequence
prediction theory by Solomonoff. We emphasize only those aspects which will be of
importance for the development of our universal AIξ model.
Simply speaking, induction is the process of predicting the future from the past or, more
precisely, it is the process of finding rules in (past) data and using these rules to guess
future data. On the one hand, induction seems to happen in every day life by finding
regularities in past observations and using them to predict the future. On the other hand,
this procedure seems to add knowledge about the future from past observations. But how
can we know something about the future? This dilemma and the induction principle in
general have a long philosophical history
• Hume’s negation of Induction (1711-1776) [12],
• Epicurus’ principle of multiple explanations (342?-270? BC),
• Occams’ razor (simplicity) princple (1290?-1349?),
• Bayes’ rule for conditional probabilites [2]
and a short but important mathematical history: a clever unification of all these aspects
into one formal theory of inductive inference has been done by Solomonoff [35] based on
Kolmogorov’s [17] definition of complexity. For an excellent introduction into Kolmogorov
complexity and Solomonoff induction one should consult the book of Li and Vita´nyi [24].
In the rest of this subsection we state all results which are needed or generalized later.
Let us choose some universal prefix Turing machine U with unidirectional binary input
and output tapes and a bidirectional working tape. We can then define the (prefix)
Kolomogorov complexity [4, 11, 17, 19] as the shortest prefix program p, for which U
outputs x=x1:n with xi ∈IB:
K(x) := min
p
{l(p) : U(p) = x}
The universal semimeasure ξ(x) is defined as the probability that the output of the uni-
versal Turing machine U starts with x when provided with fair coin flips on the input
tape [35, 36]. It is easy to see that this is equivalent to the formal definition
ξ(x) :=
∑
p : U(p)=x∗
2−l(p) (18)
where the sum is over minimal programs p for which U outputs a string starting with x.
U might be non-terminating. As the shortest programs dominate the sum, ξ is closely
related to K(x) (ξ(x) = 2−K(x)+O(K(l(x))). ξ has the important universality property [35],
that it majorizes every computable probability distribution ρ up to a multiplicative factor
depending only on ρ but not on x:
ξ(x)
×≥ 2−K(ρ) ·ρ(x). (19)
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A ’×’ above an (in)equality denotes (in)equality within a universal multiplicative constant,
a ’+’ above an (in)equality denotes (in)equality within a universal additive constant,
both depending only on the choice of the universal reference machine U . ξ itself is not
a probability distribution8. We have ξ(x0)+ ξ(x1) < ξ(x) because there are programs
p, which output just x, neither followed by 0 nor 1. They just stop after printing x
or continue forever without any further output. We will call a function ρ≥ 0 with the
properties ρ(ǫ)≤1 and ∑xn ρ(x1:n)≤ρ(x<n) a semimeasure. ξ is a semimeasure and (19)
actually holds for all enumerable semimeasures ρ.
(Binary) sequence prediction algorithms try to predict the continuation xn of a given
sequence x1...xn−1. In the following we will assume that the sequences are drawn according
to a probability distribution and that the true prior probability of x1:n is µ(x1...xn).
The probability of xn given x<n hence is µ(x<nxn). The best possible system predicts
the xn with higher probability. Usually µ is unknown and the system can only have
some belief ρ about the true prior probability µ. Let SPρ be a probabilistic sequence
predictor, predicting xn with probability ρ(x<nxn). Further we define a deterministic
sequence predictor SPΘρ predicting the xn with higher ρ probability. Θρ(x<nxn) := 1 if
ρ(x<nxn) >
1
2
and Θρ(x<nxn) := 0 otherwise. If ρ is only a semimeasure the SPρ and
SPΘρ systems might refuse any output in some cycles n. The SPΘµ is the best prediction
scheme when µ is known.
If ρ(x<nxn) converges quickly to µ(x<nxn) the number of additional prediction errors
introduced by using Θρ instead of Θµ for prediction should be small in some sense. Now
the universal probability ξ comes into play as it has been proved by Solomonoff [36] that
the µ expected Euclidean distance betweewn ξ and µ is finite
∞∑
k=1
∑
x1:k
µ(x1:k)(ξ(x<kxk)− µ(x<kxk))2
+
< 1
2
ln 2·K(µ) (20)
The ’+’ atop ’<’ means up to additive terms of order 1. So indeed the difference does tend
to zero, i.e. ξ(x<nxn)
n→∞−→ µ(x<nxn) with µ probability 1 for any computable probability
distribution µ. The reason for the astonishing property of a single (universal) function
to converge to any computable probability distribution lies in the fact that the set of
µ random sequences differ for different µ. The universality property (19) is the central
ingredient for proving (20).
Let us define the total number of expected erroneous predictions the SPρ system makes
for the first n bits
Enρ :=
n∑
k=1
∑
x1:k
µ(x1:k)(1−ρ(x<kxk)) (21)
The SPΘµ system is best in the sense that EnΘµ≤Enρ for any ρ. In [13] it has been shown
that SPΘξ is not much worse
EnΘξ−Enρ ≤ H +
√
4EnρH +H2 = O(
√
Enρ) , H
+
< ln 2·K(µ) (22)
8It is possible to normalize ξ to a probability distribution as has been done in [44, 36, 13] by giving
up the enumerability of ξ. Error bounds (20) and (22) hold for both definitions.
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with the tightest bound for ρ=Θµ. For finite E∞Θµ, E∞Θξ is finite too. For infinite E∞Θµ,
EnΘξ/EnΘµ
n→∞−→ 1 with rapid convergence. One can hardly imagine any better prediction
algorithm without extra knowledge about the environment. In [14], (20) and (22) have
been generalized from binary to arbitrary alphabet. Apart from computational aspects,
which are of course very important, the problem of sequence prediction could be viewed
as essentially solved.
Definition of the AIξ Model: We have developed enough formalism to suggest our
universal AIξ model9. All we have to do is to suitably generalize the universal semimeasure
ξ from the last subsection and replace the true but unknown prior probability µAI in the
AIµ model by this generalized ξAI . In what sense this AIξ model is universal will be
discussed later.
In the functional formulation we define the universal probability ξAI of an environment q
just as 2−l(q)
ξ(q) := 2−l(q)
The definition could not be easier10!11 Collecting the formulas of section 2 and replacing
µ(q) by ξ(q) we get the definition of the AIξ system in functional form. Given the history
y˙x˙<k the functional AIξ system outputs
y˙k := maxarg
yk
max
p:p(x˙<k)=y˙<kyk
∑
q:q(y˙<k)=x˙<k
2−l(q) · Ckmk(p, q) (23)
in cycle k, where Ckmk(p, q) is the total credit of cycles k to mk when system p inter-
acts with environment q. We have dropped the denominator
∑
q µ(q) from (1) as it is
independent of the p∈ P˙k and a constant multiplicative factor does not change maxarg.
For the iterative formulation the universal probability ξ can be obtained by inserting the
functional ξ(q) into (10)
ξ(yx1:k) =
∑
q:q(y1:k)=x1:k
2−l(q) (24)
Replacing µ by ξ in (9) the iterative AIξ system outputs
y˙k = maxarg
yk
∑
xk
max
yk+1
∑
xk+1
... max
ymk
∑
xmk
(c(xk)+ ...+c(xmk))·ξ(y˙x˙<kyxk:mk) (25)
in cycle k given the history y˙x˙<k.
One subtlety has been passed over. Like in the SP case, ξ is not a probability distribution
but satisfies only the weaker inequalities∑
xn
ξ(yx1:n) ≤ ξ(yx<n) , ξ(ǫ) ≤ 1 (26)
9Speak ’aixi’ and write AIXI without Greek letters.
10It is not necessary to use 2−K(q) or something similar as some reader may expect at this point. The
reason is that for every program q there exists a functionally equivalent program q′ with K(q′) = l(q′).
11Here and later we identify objects with their coding relative to some fixed Turing machine U . For
example, if q is a function K(q) := K(⌈q⌉) with ⌈q⌉ being a binary coding of q such that U(⌈q⌉, y) := q(y).
On the other hand, if q already is a binary string we define q(y) := U(q, y).
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Note, that the sum on the l.h.s. is not independent of yn unlike for chronological probability
distributions. Nevertheless, it is bounded by something (the r.h.s) which is independent of
yn. The reason is that the sum in (24) runs over (partial recursive) chronological functions
only and the functions q which satisfy q(y1:n) = x<n∗ are a subset of the functions satisfy-
ing q(y<n) = x<n. Therefore we will in general call functions satisfying (26) chronological
semimeasures. The important point is that the conditional probabilities (4) are ≤1 like
for true probability distributions.
The equivalence of the functional and iterative AI model proven in section 3 is true for
every chronological semimeasure ρ, esp. for ξ, hence we can talk about the AIξ model
in this respect. It (slightly) depends on the choice of universal Turing machine. l(q) is
defined only up to an additive constant. It also depends on the choice of X = C×X ′
and Y , but we do not expect any bias when the spaces are chosen sufficiently simple, e.g.
all strings of length 216. Choosing IN as word space would be optimal, but whether the
maxima (suprema) exist in this case, has to be shown beforehand. The only non-trivial
dependence is on the horizon function mk which will be discussed later. So apart from mk
and unimportant details the AIξ system is uniquely defined by (23) or (25). It doesn’t
depend on assumptions about the environment apart from being generated from some
computable (but unknown!) probability distribution.
Universality of ξAI: In which sense the AIξ model is optimal will be clarified later.
In this and the next two subsections we show that ξAI defined in (24) is universal and
converges to µAI analog to the SP case (19) and (20). The proofs are generalizations from
the SP case. The y are pure spectators and cause no difficulties in the generalization. The
replacement of the binary alphabet IB used in SP by the (possibly infinite) alphabet X
is possible, but needs to be done with care. In (19) U(p) = x∗ produces strings starting
with x, whereas in (24) we can demand q to output exactly n words x1:n as q knows n
from the number of input words y1...yn. For proofs of (19) and (20) see [36] and [22].
There is an alternative definition of ξ which coincides with (24) within a multiplicative
constant of O(1),
ξ(yx1:n)
×
=
∑
ρ
2−K(ρ)ρ(yx1:n) (27)
where the sum runs over all enumerable chronological semimeasures. The 2−K(ρ) weighted
sum over probabilistic environments ρ, coincides with the sum over 2−l(q) weighted de-
terministic environments q, as will be proved below. In the next subsection we show
that an enumeration of all enumerable functions can be converted into an enumeration of
enumerable chronological semimeasures ρ. K(ρ) is co-enumerable, therefore ξ defined in
(27) is itself enumerable. The representation (24) is also enumerable. As
∑
ρ 2
−K(ρ) ≤ 1
and the ρ′s satisfy (26), ξ is a chronological semimeasure as well. If we pick one ρ in (27)
we get the universality property ”for free”
ξ(yx1:n)
×≥ 2−K(ρ)ρ(yx1:n) (28)
ξ is a universal element in the sense of (28) in the set of all enumerable chronological
semimeasures.
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To prove universality of ξ in the form (24) we have to show that for every enumerable
chronological semimeasure ρ there exists a Turing machine T with
ρ(yx1:n) =
∑
q:T (qy1:n)=x1:n
2−l(q) and l(T ) += K(ρ). (29)
This will not be done here. Given T the universality of ξ follows from
ξ(yx1:n) =
∑
q:U(qy1:n)=x1:n
2−l(q) ≥ ∑
q:U(Tq′y1:n)=x1:n
2−l(Tq
′) = 2−l(T )
∑
q:T (q′y1:n)=x1:n
2−l(q
′) ×= 2−K(ρ)ρ(yx1:n)
The first equality and (24) are identical by definition. In the inequality we have restricted
the sum over all q to q of the form q=Tq′. The third relation is true as running U on Tz
is a simulation of T on z. The last equality follows from (29). All enumerable, universal,
chronological semimeasures coincide up to a multiplicative constant, as they mutually
dominate each other. Hence, definitions (24) and (27) are, indeed, equivalent.
Converting general functions into chronological semi-measures: To complete
the proof of the universality (28) of ξ we need to convert enumerable functions ψ : IB∗→
IR+ into enumerable chronological semi-measures ρ : (Y ×X)∗→ IR+ with certain addi-
tional properties. Every enumerable function like ψ and ρ can be approximated from below
by definition12 by primitive recursive functions ϕ : IB∗×IN→IQ+ and φ : (Y×X)∗×IN→IQ+
with ψ(s) = supt ϕ(s, t) and ρ(s) = supt φ(s, t) and recursion parameter t. For arguments
of the form s=yx1:n we recursively (in n) construct φ from ϕ as follows:
ϕ′(yx1:n, t) :=
{
ϕ(yx1:n, t) for xn < t
0 for xn ≥ t , ϕ
′(ǫ, t) := ϕ(ǫ, t) (30)
φ(ǫ, t) := max
0≤i≤t
{
ϕ′(ǫ, i) : ϕ′(ǫ, i) ≤ 1
}
(31)
φ(yx1:n, t) := max
0≤i≤t
{
ϕ′(yx1:n, i) :
∑
xnϕ
′(yx1:n, i) ≤ φ(yx<n, t)
}
(32)
With xn<t we mean that the natural number associated with string xn is smaller than
t. According to (30) with ϕ also ϕ′ as well as
∑
xn ϕ
′ are primitive recursive functions.
Further, if we allow t=0 we have ϕ′(s, 0) = 0. This ensures that φ is a total function.
In the following we prove by induction over n that φ is a primitive recursive chrono-
logical semimeasure monotone increasing in t. All necessary properties hold for n = 0
(yx1:0= ǫ) according to (31). For general n assume that the induction hypothesis is true
for φ(yx<n, t). We can see from (32) that φ(yx1:n, t) is monotone increasing in t. φ is
total as ϕ′(yx1:n, i=0)= 0 satisfies the inequality. By assumption φ(yx<n, t) is primitive
recursive, hence with
∑
xn ϕ
′ also the order relation
∑
ϕ′≤φ is primitive recursive. This
ensures that the non-empty finite set {ϕ′ : ∑ϕ′ ≤ φ}i and its maximum φ(yx1:n, t) are
primitive recursive. Further, φ(yx1:n, t)=ϕ
′(yx1:n, i) for some i with i≤ t independent of
12Defining enumerability as the supremum of total primitive recursive functions is more suitable for our
purpose than the equivalent definition as a limit of monotone increasing partial recursive functions. In
terms of Turing machines, the recursion parameter is the time after which a computation is terminated.
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xn. Thus,
∑
xn φ(yx1:n, t) =
∑
xn ϕ
′(yx1:n, i) ≤ φ(yx<n, t) which is the condition for φ being
a chronological semimeasure. Inductively we have proved that φ is indeed a primitive
recursive chronological semimeasure monotone increasing in t.
In the following we show that every (total)13 enumerable chronological semimeasure ρ can
be enumerated by some φ. By definition of enumerability there exist primitive recursive
functions ϕ˜ with ρ(s) = supt ϕ˜(s, t). The function ϕ(s, t) := (1−1/t) ·maxi<t ϕ˜(s, i) also
enumerates ρ but has the additional advantage of being strictly monotone increasing in t.
ϕ′(yx1:n,∞)=ϕ(yx1:n,∞)=ρ(yx1:n) by definition (30). φ(ǫ, t)=ϕ′(ǫ, t) by (31) and the fact
that ϕ′(ǫ, i−1) < ϕ′(ǫ, i)≤ϕ(ǫ, i)≤ρ(ǫ)≤1, hence φ(ǫ,∞)=ρ(ǫ). φ(yx1:n, t)≤ϕ′(yx1:n, t) by
(32), hence φ(yx1:n,∞)≤ρ(yx1:n). We prove the opposite direction φ(yx1:n,∞)≥ρ(yx1:n)
by induction over n. We have∑
xn
ϕ′(yx1:n, i) ≤
∑
xn
ϕ(yx1:n, i) <
∑
xn
ϕ(yx1:n,∞) =
∑
xn
ρ(yx1:n) ≤ ρ(yx<n) (33)
The strict monotony of ϕ and the semimeasure property of ρ have been used. By in-
duction hypothesis limt→∞ φ(yx<n, t)≥ ρ(yx<n) and (33) for sufficiently large t we have
φ(yx<n, t) >
∑
xn ϕ
′(yx1:n, i). The condition in (32) is, hence, satisfied and therefore
φ(yx1:n, t)≥ϕ′(yx1:n, i) for sufficiently large t, especially φ(yx1:n,∞)≥ϕ′(yx1:n, i) for all i.
Taking the limit i→∞ we get φ(yx1:n,∞)≥ϕ′(yx1:n,∞)=ρ(yx1:n).
Combining all results, we have shown that the constructed φ(·, t) are primitive recursive
chronological semimeasures monotone increasing in t, which converge to the enumerable
chronological semimeasure ρ. This finally proves the enumerability of the set of enumer-
able chronological semimeasures.
Convergence of ξAI to µAI : In [14] the following inequality is proved
2
|X|∑
i=1
yi(yi−zi)2 ≤
|X|∑
i=1
yi ln
yi
zi
with
|X|∑
i=1
yi = 1,
|X|∑
i=1
zi ≤ 1 (34)
If we identify i = xk and yi = µ(yx<kyxk) and zi = ξ(yx<kyxk), multiply both sides
with µ(yx<k), take the sum over x<k, then the sum over k and use Bayes’ rule
µ(yx<k)·µ(yx<kyxk) = µ(yx1:k) we get
2
n∑
k=1
∑
x1:k
µ(yx1:k)
(
µ(yx<kxk)− ξ(yx<kxk)
)2 ≤ n∑
k=1
∑
x1:k
µ(yx1:k) ln
µ(yx<kxk)
ξ(yx<kxk)
= ... (35)
In the r.h.s. we can replace
∑
x1:k µ(yx1:k) by
∑
x1:n µ(yx1:n) as the argument of the logarithm
is independent of xk+1:n. The k sum can now be brought into the logarithm and converts
to a product. Using Bayes’ rule (4) for µ and ξ we get
... =
∑
x1:n
µ(yx1:n) ln
n∏
k=1
µ(yx<kxk)
ξ(yx<kxk)
=
∑
x1:n
µ(yx1:n) ln
µ(yx1:n)
ξ(yx1:n)
+
< ln 2·K(µ) (36)
13Semimeasures are, by definition, total functions.
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where we have used the universality property (28) of ξ in the last step. The main com-
plication for generalizing (20) to (35,36) was the generalization of (34) from |X|= 2 to
a general alphabet, the y are, again, pure spectators. This will change when we analyze
error/credit bounds analog to (22).
(35,36) shows that the µ expected squared difference of µ and ξ is finite for computable µ.
This, in turn, shows that ξ(yx<kyxk) converges to µ(yx<kyxk) for k→∞ with µ probability
1. If we take a finite product of ξ′s and use Bayes’ rule, we see that also ξ(yx<kyxk:k+r)
converges to µ(yx<kyxk:k+r). More generally, in case of a bounded horizon hk, it follows
that
ξ(yx<kyxk:mk)
k→∞−→ µ(yx<kyxk:mk) if hk ≡ mk−k+1 ≤ hmax <∞ (37)
This gives makes us confident that the outputs y˙k of the AIξ model (25) could converge
to the outputs y˙k from the AIµ model (9), at least for bounded horizon.
We want to call an AI model universal, if it is µ independent (unbiased, model-free) and
is able to solve any solvable problem and learn any learnable task. Further, we call a
universal model, universally optimal, if there is no program, which can solve or learn
significantly faster (in terms of interaction cycles). As the AIξ model is parameterless,
ξ converges to µ (37), the AIµ model is itself optimal, and we expect no other model to
converge faster to AIµ by analogy to SP (22),
we expect AIξ to be universally optimal.
This is our main claim. In a sense, the intention of the remaining (sub)sections is to
define this statement more rigorously and to give further support.
Intelligence order relation: We define the ξ expected credit in cycles k to m of a
policy p similar to (1) and (23). We extend the definition to programs p 6∈ P˙k which are
not consistent with the current history.
Cξkm(p|y˙x˙<k) :=
1
N
∑
q:q(y˙<k)=x˙<k
2−l(q) · Ckm(p˜, q) (38)
The normalization N is again only necessary for interpreting Ckm as the expected credit
but otherwise unneeded. For consistent policies p∈ P˙k we define p˜ :=p. For p 6∈ P˙k, p˜ is a
modification of p in such a way that its output is consistent with the current history y˙x˙<k,
hence p˜∈ P˙k, but unaltered for the current and future cycles ≥ k. Using this definition
of Ckm we could take the maximium over all systems p in (23), rather than only the
consistent ones.
We call p more or equally intelligent than p′ if
p  p′ :⇔ ∀k∀y˙x˙<k : Cξkmk(p|y˙x˙<k) ≥ Cξkmk(p′|y˙x˙<k) (39)
i.e. if p yields in any circumstance higher ξ expected credit than p′. As the algorithm p∗
behind the AIξ system maximizes Cξkmk we have p
∗p for all p. The AIξ model is hence
the most intelligent system w.r.t. .  is a universal order relation in the sense that it
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is free of any parameters (except mk) or specific assumptions about the environment. A
proof, that  is a reliable intelligence order (what we believe to be true), would prove that
AIξ is universally optimal. We could further ask: how useful is  for ordering policies
of practical interest with intermediate intelligence, or how can  help to guide toward
constructing more intelligent systems with reasonable computation time. An effective
intelligence order relation c will be defined in section 10, which is more useful from a
practical point of view.
Credit bounds and separability concepts: The credits Ckm associated with the AI
systems correspond roughly to the negative error measure −Enρ of the SP systems. In SP,
we were interested in small bounds for the error excess EnΘξ−Enρ. Unfortunately, simple
credit bounds for AIξ in terms of Ckm analog to the error bound (22) do not hold. We
even have difficulties in specifying what we can expect to hold for AIξ or any AI system
which claims to be universally optimal. Consequently, we cannot have a proof if we don’t
know what to prove. In SP, the only important property of µ for proving error bounds
was its complexity K(µ). We will see that in the AI case, there are no useful bounds in
terms of K(µ) only. We either have to study restricted problem classes or consider bounds
depending on other properties of µ, rather than on its complexity only. In the following,
we will exhibit the difficulties by two examples and introduce concepts which may be
useful for proving credit bounds. Despite the difficulties in even claiming useful credit
bounds, we nevertheless, firmly believe that the order relation (39) correctly formalizes the
intuitive meaning of intelligence and, hence, that the AIξ system is universally optimal.
In the following, we choose mk=T . We want to compare the true, i.e. µ expected credit
Cµ1T of a µ independent universal policy p
best with any other policy p. Naively, we might
expect the existence of a policy pbest which maximizes Cµ1T , apart from additive corrections
of lower order for T→∞
Cµ1T (p
best) ≥ Cµ1T (p)− o(...) ∀µ, p (40)
Note, that the policy p∗ξ of the AIξ system maximizes Cξ1T by definition (p
∗ξ  p). As Cξ1T
is thought to be a guess of Cµ1T , we might expect p
best= p∗ξ to approximately maximize
Cµ1T , i.e. (40) to hold. Let us consider the problem class (set of environments) {µ0, µ1}
with Y =C= {0, 1} and ck= δiy1 in environment µi. The first output y1 decides whether
you go to heaven with all future credits ck being 1 (good) or to hell with all future credits
being 0 (bad). It is clear, that if µi, i.e. i is known, the optimal policy p
∗µi is to output
y1= i in the first cycle with C
µ
1T (p
∗µi)=T . On the other hand, any unbiased policy pbest
independent of the actual µ either outputs y1 = 1 or y1 = 0. Independent of the actual
choice y1, there is always an environment (µ=µ1−y1) for which this choice is catastrophic
(Cµ1T (p
best)=0). No single system can perform well in both environments µ0 and µ1. The
r.h.s. of (40) equals T−o(T ) for p=p∗µ. For all pbest there is a µ for which the l.h.s. is zero.
We have shown that no pbest can satisfy (40) for all µ and p, so we cannot expect p∗ξ to
do so. Nevertheless, there are problem classes for which (40) holds, for instance SP and
CF. For SP, (40) is just a reformulation of (22) with an appropriate choice for pbest (which
differs from p∗ξ, see next section). We expect (40) to hold for all inductive problems in
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which the environment is not influenced14 by the output of the system. We want to call
these µ, passive or inductive environments. Further, we want to call µ satisfying (40) with
pbest=p∗ξ pseudo passive. So we expect inductive µ to be pseudo passive.
Let us give a further example to demonstrate the difficulties in establishing credit bounds.
Let C= {0, 1} and |Y | be large. We consider all (deterministic) environments in which a
single complex output y∗ is correct (c=1) and all others are wrong (c=0). The problem
class M is defined by
M := {µ : µ(yx<kyk1) = δyky∗ , y∗∈Y, K(y∗)= ⌊ log2 |Y |⌋}
There are N
×
= |Y | such y∗. The only way a µ independent policy p can find the correct
y∗, is by trying one y after the other in a certain order. In the first N −1 cycles at
most, N−1 different y are tested. As there are N different possible y∗, there is always
a µ ∈M for which p gives erroneous outputs in the first N−1 cycles. The number of
errors are E∞p≥N−1 ×= |Y | ×= 2K(y∗) ×= 2K(µ) for this µ. As this is true for any p, it is
also true for the AIξ model, hence Ekξ ≤ 2K(µ) is the best possible error bound we can
expect, which depends on K(µ) only. Actually, we will derive such a bound in section 5
for SP. Unfortunately, as we are mainly interested in the cycle region k ≪ |Y | ×= 2K(µ)
(see section 3) this bound is trivial. There are no interesting bounds depending on K(µ)
only, unlike the SP case for deterministic µ. Bounds must either depend on additional
properties of µ or we have to consider specialized bounds for restricted problem classes.
The case of probabilistic µ is similar. Whereas for SP there are useful bounds in terms of
Ekµ and K(µ), there are no such bounds for AIξ. Again, this is not a drawback of AIξ
since for no unbiased AI system the errors/credits could be bound in terms of K(µ) and
the errors/credits of AIµ only.
There is a way to make use of gross (e.g. 2K(µ)) bounds. Assume that after a reasonable
number of cycles k, the information x˙<k perceived by the AIξ system contains a lot of
information about the true environment µ. The information in x˙<k might be coded in
any form. Let us assume that the complexity K(µ|x˙<k) of µ under the condition that
x˙<k is known, is of order 1. Consider a theorem, bounding the sum of credits or of other
quantities over cycles 1...∞ in terms of f(K(µ)) for a function f with f(O(1))=O(1), like
f(n)=2n. Then, there will be a bound for cycles k...∞ in terms of f(K(µ|x˙<k))=O(1).
Hence, a bound like 2K(µ) can be replaced by small bound 2K(µ|x˙<k) =O(1) after a rea-
sonable number of cycles. All one has to show/ensure/assume is that enough information
about µ is presented (in any form) in the first k cycles. In this way, even a gross bound
could become useful. In section 8 we use a similar argument to prove that AIξ is able to
learn supervised.
In the following, we weaken (40) in the hope of getting a bound applicable to wider
problem classes than the passive one. Consider the I/O sequence y˙1x˙1...y˙nx˙n caused by
AIξ. On history y˙x˙<k, AIξ will output y˙k≡ y˙ξk in cycle k. Let us compare this to y˙µk what
AIµ would output, still on the same history y˙x˙<k produced by AIξ. As AIµ maximizes
14Of course, the credit feedback ck depends on the system’s output. What we have in mind is, like in
sequence prediction, that the true sequence is not influenced by the system
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the µ expected credit, AIξ causes lower (or at best equal) Cµkmk , if y˙
ξ
k differs from y˙
µ
k . Let
Dnµξ := 〈∑nk=1 1−δy˙µ
k
,y˙ξ
k
〉µ be the µ expected number of suboptimal choices of AIξ, i.e.
outputs different from AIµ in the first n cycles. One might weigh the deviating cases by
their severity. Especially when the µ expected credits Cµkmk for y˙
ξ
k and y˙
µ
k are equal or
close to each other, this should be taken into account in the definition of Dnµξ. These
details do not matter in the following qualitative discussion. The important difference
to (40) is that here we stick on the history produced by AIξ and count a wrong decision
as, at most, one error. The wrong decision in the Heaven&Hell example in the first cycle
no longer counts as losing T credits, but counts as one wrong decision. In a sense, this
is fairer. One shouldn’t blame somebody too much who makes a single wrong decision
for which he just has too little information available, in order to make a correct decision.
The AIξ model would deserve to be called asymptotically optimal, if the probability of
making a wrong decision tends to zero, i.e. if
Dnµξ/n→ 0 for n→∞, i.e. Dnµξ = o(n). (41)
We say that µ can be asymptotically learned (by AIξ) if (41) is satisfied. We claim
that AIξ (for mk→∞) can asymptotically learn every problem µ of relevance, i.e. AIξ
is asymptotically optimal. We included the qualifier of relevance, as we are not sure
whether there could be strange µ spoiling (41) but we expect those µ to be irrelevant
from the perspective of AI. In the field of Learning, there are many asymptotic learnability
theorems, often not too difficult to prove. So a proof of (41) might also be accessible.
Unfortunately, asymptotic learnability theorems are often too weak to be useful from a
practical point. Nevertheless, they point in the right direction.
From the convergence (37) of µ→ξ we might expect Cξkmk→Cµkmk and hence, y˙ξk defined in
(25) to converge to y˙µk defined in (9) with µ probability 1 for k→∞. The first problem is,
that if the Ckmk for the different choices of yk are nearly equal, then even if C
ξ
kmk
≈Cµkmk ,
y˙ξk 6= y˙µk is possible due to the non-continuity of maxargyk . This can be cured by a weighted
Dnµξ as described above. More serious is the second problem we explain for hk =1 and
X=C={0, 1}. For y˙ξk≡maxargyk ξ(y˙c˙<kyk1) to converge to y˙µk ≡maxargyk µ(y˙c˙<kyk1), it
is not sufficient to know that ξ(y˙c˙<ky˙c˙k)→µ(y˙c˙<ky˙c˙k) as has been proved in (37). We need
convergence not only for the true output y˙k and credit c˙k, but also for alternate outputs
yk and credit 1. y˙
ξ
k converges to y˙
µ
k if ξ converges uniformly to µ, i.e. if in addition to (37)
|µ(yx<ky′kx′k)− ξ(yx<ky′kx′k)| < c·|µ(yx<kyxk)− ξ(yx<kyxk)| ∀y′kx′k (42)
holds for some constant c (at least in some µ expected sense). We call µ satisfying (42)
uniform. For uniform µ one can show (41) with appropriately weighted Dnµξ and bounded
horizon hk<hmax. Unfortunately there are relevant µ which are not uniform. Details will
be given elsewhere.
In the following, we briefly mention some further concepts. A Markovian µ is defined
as depending only on the last output, i.e. µ(yx<kyxk)=µk(yxk). We say µ is generalized
Markovian, if µ(yx<kyxk)=µk(yxk−l:k−1yxk) for fixed l. This property has some similarities
to factorizable µ defined in (15). If further µk ≡ µ1∀k, µ is called stationary. Further,
for all enumerable µ, µ(yx<kyxk) and ξ(yx<kyxk) get independent of yx<l for fixed l and
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k→∞ with µ probability 1. This property, which we want to call forgetfulness, will be
proved elsewhere. Further, we say µ is farsighted, if limmk→∞ y˙
(mk)
k exists. More details
will be given in the next subsection, where we also give an example of a possibly relevant
µ, which is not farsighted.
We have introduced several concepts, which might be useful for proving credit bounds,
including forgetful, relevant, asymptotically learnable, farsighted, uniform, (generalized)
Markovian, factorizable and (pseudo) passive µ. We have sorted them here, approximately
in the order of decreasing generality. We want to call them separability concepts. The more
general (like relevant, asymptotically learnable and farsighted) µ will be called weakly
separable, the more restrictive (like (pseudo) passive and factorizable) µ will be called
strongly separable, but we will use these qualifiers in a more qualitative, rather than rigid
sense. Other (non-separability) concepts are deterministic µ and, of course, the class of
all chronological µ.
The choice of the horizon: The only significant arbitrariness in the AIξ model lies
in the choice of the horizon function hk≡mk−k+1. We discuss some choices which seem
to be natural and give preliminary conclusions at the end. We will not discuss ad hoc
choices of hk for specific problems (like the discussion in section 6 in the context of finite
games). We are interested in universal choices of mk.
If the lifetime of the system is known to be T , which is in practice always large but finite,
then the choice mk=T maximizes correctly the expected future credit. T is usually not
known in advance, as in many cases the time we are willing to run a system depends
on the quality of its outputs. For this reason, it is often desirable that good outputs
are not delayed too much, if this results in a marginal credit increase only. This can be
incorporated by damping the future credits. If, for instance, we assume that the survival
of the system in each cycle is proportional to the past credit an exponential damping
ck := c
′
k ·e−λk is appropriate, where c′k are bounded, e.g. c′k ∈ [0, 1]. The expression (25)
converges for mk→∞ in this case. But this does not solve the problem, as we introduced
a new arbitrary time-scale 1/λ. Every damping introduces a time-scale.
Even the time-scale invariant damping factor k−α introduces a dynamic time-scale. In
cycle k the contribution of cycle 21/α·k is damped by a factor 1
2
. The effective horizon hk in
this case is ∼ k. The choice hk=β·k with β∼21/α qualitatively models the same behaviour.
We have not introduced an arbitrary time-scale T , but limited the farsightedness to some
multiple (or fraction) of the length of the current history. This avoids the pre-selection
of a global time-scale T or 1/λ. This choice has some appeal, as it seems that humans
of age k years usually do not plan their lives for more than, perhaps, the next k years
(βhuman=1). From a practical point of view this model might serve all needs, but from
a theoretical point we feel uncomfortable with such a limitation in the horizon from the
very beginning. Note, that we have to choose β=O(1) because otherwise we would again
introduce a number β, which has to be justified.
The naive limitmk→∞ in (25) may turn out to be well defined and the previous discussion
superfluous. In the following, we define a limit which is always well defined (for finite |Y |).
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Let y˙
(m)
k be defined as in (25) with mk replaced by m. Further, let Y˙
(m)
k :={ y˙(m)k :mk≥m}
be the set of outputs in cycle k for the choices mk = m,m + 1, m + 2, .... Because
Y˙
(m)
k ⊇ Y˙ (m+1)k 6= {}, we have Y˙ (∞)k :=
⋂∞
m=k Y˙
(m)
k 6= {}. We define the mk =∞ model to
output any y˙
(∞)
k ∈ Y˙ (∞)k . This is the best output consistent with any choice of mk, esp.
mk→∞. Choosing the lexicographically smallest y˙(∞)k ∈ Y˙ (∞)k would correspond to the
limes inferior limm→∞y˙
(m)
k . y˙
(∞)
k is unique, i.e. |Y˙ (∞)k |=1 iff the naive limit limm→∞ y˙(m)k
exists. Note, that the limit limm→∞C∗km(yx<k) needs not to exist for this construction.
The construction above leads to a mathematically elegant, no-parameter AIξ model. Un-
fortunately this is not the end of the story. The limit mk →∞ can cause undesirable
results in the AIµ model for special µ which might also happen in the AIξ model what-
ever we define mk→∞. Consider Y =C = {0, 1} and X ′= {}. Output yk=0 shall give
credit ck = 0, output yk = 1 shall give ck = 1 iff y˙k−l−
√
l...y˙k−l = 0...0 for some l. I.e. the
system can achieve l consecutive positive credits if there was a sequence of length at least√
l with yk= ck =0. If the lifetime of the AIµ system is T , it outputs y˙k=0 in the first
r cycles and then y˙k = 1 for the remaining r
2 cycles with r such that r + r2 = T . This
will lead to the highest possible total credit C1T =
√
T +1/4 −1/2. Any fragmentation of
the 0 and 1 sequences would reduce this. For T→∞ the AIµ system can and will delay
the point r of switching to y˙k = 1 indefinitely and always output 0 with total credit 0,
obviously the worst possible behaviour. The AIξ system will explore the above rule after
a while of trying yk=0/1 and then applies the same behaviour as the AIµ system, since
the simplest rules covering past data dominate ξ. For finite T this is exactly what we
want, but for infinite T the AIξ model fails just as the AIµ model does. The good point
is, that this is not a weakness of the AIξ model, as AIµ fails too and no system can be
better than AIµ. The bad point is that mk→∞ has far reaching consequences, even when
starting from an already very large mk=T . The reason being that the µ of this example
is highly non-local in time, i.e. it may violate one of our weak separability conditions.
In the last paragraph we have considered the consequences of mk→∞ in the AIµ model.
We now consider whether the AIξ model is a good approximation of the AIµ model for
large mk. Another objection against too large choices of mk is that ξ(yx<kyxk:mk) has
been proved to be a good approximation of µ(yx<kyxk:mk) only for k≫hk, which is never
satisfied for mk=T or mk=∞. We have seen that, for factorizable µ, the limit hk→∞
causes no problem, as from a certain hk on the output y˙k is independent of hk. As ξ→µ
for bounded hk, ξ will develop this separability property too. So, from a certain k0 on
the limit hk →∞ might also be safe for ξ. Therefore, taking the limit from the very
beginning worsens the behaviour of AIξ maybe only for finitely many cycles k≤ k0, which
would be acceptable. We suppose that the valuations ck′ for k
′ ≫ k, where ξ can no
longer be trusted as a good approximation to µ, are in some sense randomly disturbed
with decreasing influence on the choice of y˙k. This claim is supported by the forgetfulness
property of ξ.
We are not sure whether the choice of mk is of marginal importance, as long as mk is
chosen sufficiently large and of low complexity, mk = 2
216 for instance, or whether the
choice of mk will turn out to be a central topic for the AIξ model or for the planning
aspect of any AI system in general. We suppose that the limit mk→∞ for the AIξ model
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results in correct behaviour for weakly separable µ, and that even the naive limit exists,
but to prove this would probably give interesting insights.
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5 Sequence Prediction (SP)
We have introduced the AIξ model as a unification of the ideas of decision theory and
universal probability distribution. We might expect AIξ to behave identically to SPΘξ,
when faced with a sequence prediction problem, but things are not that simple, as we will
see.
Using the AIµ Model for Sequence Prediction: We have seen in the last section
how to predict sequences for known and unknown prior distribution µSP . Here we consider
binary sequences15 z1z2z3... ∈ IB∞ with known prior probability µSP (z1z2z3...).
We want to show how the AIµ model can be used for sequence prediction. We will see
that it gives the same prediction as the SPΘµ system. First, we have to specify how the
AIµ model should be used for sequence prediction. The following choice is natural:
The systems output yk is interpreted as a prediction for the k
th bit zk of the string, which
has to be predicted. This means that yk is binary (yk ∈ IB =: Y ). As a reaction of the
environment, the system receives credit ck =1 if the prediction was correct (yk= zk), or
ck=0 if the prediction was erroneous (yk 6=zk). The question is what the input x′k of the
next cycle should be. One choice would be to inform the system about the correct kth bit
of the last cycle of the string and set x′k = zk. But as from the credit ck in conjunction with
the prediction yk, the true bit zk = δykck can be inferred, this information is redundant.
δ is the Kronecker symbol, defined as δab = 1 for a = b and 0 otherwise. There is no
need for this additional feedback. So we set x′k = ǫ∈X = {ǫ} thus having xk ≡ ck. The
system’s performance does not change when we include this redundant information, it
merely complicates the notation. The prior probability µAI of the AIµ model is
µAI(y1x1...ykxk) = µ
AI(y1c1...ykck) = µ
SP (δy1c1...δykck) = µ
SP (z1...zk) (43)
In the following, we will drop the superscripts of µ because they are clear from the
arguments of µ and the µ equal in any case.
The formula (7) for the expected credit reduces to
C∗km(yx<k) = maxyk
∑
ck
[ck + C
∗
k+1,m(yx1:k)]·µ(δy1c1...δyk−1ck−1δykck) (44)
The first observation we can make, is that for this special µ, C∗km only depends on δyici, i.e.
replacing yi and ci simultaneously with their complements does not change the value of
C∗km. We have a symmetry in yici. For k=m+1 this is definitely true as C
∗
m+1,m=0 in this
case (see (6)). For k≤m we prove it by induction. The r.h.s. of (44) is symmetric in yici for
i<k because µ possesses this symmetry and C∗k+1,m possesses it by induction hypothesis,
so the symmetry holds for the l.h.s., which completes the proof. The prediction y˙k is
y˙k = maxarg
yk
C∗kmk(y˙x˙<kyk) = maxargyk
∑
ck
[ck + C
∗
k+1,mk
(yx1:k)]·µ(...δykck) = (45)
15We use zk to avoid notational conflicts with the systems inputs xk.
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= maxarg
yk
∑
ck
ck ·µ(δy˙1c˙1...δykck) = maxarg
yk
µ(z˙1...z˙k−1yk) = maxargzk
µ(z˙1...z˙k−1zk)
The first equation is the definition of the system’s prediction (8). In the second equation,
we have inserted (5) which gives the r.h.s. of (44) with maxyk replaced by maxargyk .∑
c f(...δyc...) is independent of y for any function, depending on the combination δyc only.
Therefore, the
∑
cC
∗µ term is independent of yk because C∗k+1,m as well as µ depend on
δykck only. In the third equation, we can therefore drop this term, as adding a constant to
the argument of maxargyk does not change the location of the maximum. In the second
last equation we evaluated the
∑
ck . Further, if the true credit to y˙i is c˙i the true i
th bit
of the string must be z˙i=δy˙ic˙i . The last equation is just a renaming.
So, the AIµ model predicts that zk that has maximal µ probability, given z˙1...z˙k−1. This
prediction is independent of the choice of mk. It is exactly the prediction scheme of the
deterministic sequence prediction with known prior SPΘµ described in the last section.
As this model was optimal, AIµ is optimal, too, i.e. has minimal number of expected
errors (maximal expected credit) as compared to any other sequence prediction scheme.
From this, it is already clear that the total expected credit Ckm must be related to the
expected sequence prediction error EmΘµ (21). Let us prove directly that C1m(ǫ)+EmΘµ =
m. We rewrite C∗km in (44) as a function of zi instead of yici as it is symmetric in yici.
Further, we can pull C∗km out of the maximization, as it is independent of yk similar to
(45). Renaming the bounded variables yk and ck we get
C∗km(z<k) = maxzk
µ(z<kzk) +
∑
zk
C∗k+1,m(z1:k)·µ(z<kzk) (46)
Recursively inserting the l.h.s. into the r.h.s. we get
C∗km(z<k) =
m∑
i=k
∑
zk:i−1
max
zi
µ(z<kzk:i) (47)
This is most easily proven by induction. For k=m we have C∗mm(z<m)=maxzm µ(z<mzm)
from (46) and (6), which equals (47). By induction hypothesis, we assume that (47) is
true for k. Inserting this into (46) we get
C∗km(z<k) = maxzk
µ(z<kzk) +
∑
zk

 m∑
i=k+1
∑
zk+1:i−1
max
zi
µ(z1:kzk+1:i)

µ(z<kzk) =
= max
zk
µ(z<kzk) +
m∑
i=k+1
∑
zk:i−1
max
zi
µ(z<kzk:i)
which equals (47). This was the induction step and hence (47) is proven.
By setting k=0 and slightly reformulating (47), we get the total expected credit in the
first m cycles
C∗1:m(ǫ) =
m∑
i=1
∑
z<i
µ(z<i)max{µ(z<i0), µ(z<i1)} = m− EmΘµ
with EmΘµ defined in (21).
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Using the AIξ Model for Sequence Prediction: Now we want to use the universal
AIξ model instead of AIµ for sequence prediction and try to derive error bounds analog to
(22). Like in the AIµ case, the systems output yk in cycle k is interpreted as a prediction
for the kth bit zk of the string, which has to be predicted. The credit is ck = δykzk and
there are no other inputs xk = ǫ. What makes the analysis more difficult is that ξ is
not symmetric in yici ↔ (1 − yi)(1 − ci) and (43) does not hold for ξ. On the other
hand, ξAI converges to µAI in the limit (37), and (43) should hold asymptotically for ξ
in some sense. So we expect that everything proven for AIµ holds approximately for AIξ.
The AIξ model should behave similarly to SPΘξ, the deterministic variant of Solomonoff
prediction. Especially we expect error bounds similar to (22). Making this rigorous seems
difficult. Some general remarks have been made in the last section.
Here we concentrate on the special case of a deterministic computable environment, i.e.
the environment is a sequence z˙= z˙1z˙2..., K(z˙1...z˙n∗)≤K(z˙)<∞. Furthermore, we only
consider the simplest horizon model mk = k, i.e. maximize only the next credit. This is
sufficient for sequence prediction, as the credit of cycle k only depends on output yk and
not on earlier decisions. This choice is in no way sufficient and satisfactory for the full
AIξ model, as one single choice of mk should serve for all AI problem classes. So AIξ
should allow good sequence prediction for some universal choice of mk and not only for
mk=k, which definitely does not suffice for more complicated AI problems. The analysis
of this general case is a challenge for the future. For mk = k the AIξ model (25) with
x′i=ǫ reduces to
y˙k = maxarg
yk
∑
ck
ck ·ξ(y˙c˙<kyck) = maxarg
yk
ξ(y˙c˙<kyk1) = maxarg
yk
ξ(y˙c˙<kyk1) (48)
The environmental response c˙k is given by δy˙k z˙k ; it is 1 for a correct prediction (y˙k= z˙k)
and 0 otherwise. In the following, we want to bound the number of errors this prediction
scheme makes. We need the following inequality
ξ(yc1...yck) > 2
−K(δy1c1 ...δykck∗)−O(1) (49)
We have to find a short program in the sum (24) calculating c1...ck from y1...yk. If we
knew zi := δyici for 1≤ i≤k a program of size O(1) could calculate c1...ck = δy1z1 ...δykzk .
So combining this program with a shortest coding of z1...zk leads to a program of size
K(z1...zk∗)+O(1), which proves (49).
Let us now assume that we make a wrong prediction in cycle k, i.e. c˙k=0, y˙k 6= z˙k. The
goal is to show that ξ˙ defined by
ξ˙k := ξ(y˙c˙1:k) = ξ(y˙c˙<ky˙k0) ≤ ξ(y˙c˙<k)− ξ(y˙c˙<ky˙k1) < ξ˙k−1 − α
decreases for every wrong prediction, at least by some α. The ≤ arises from the fact that
ξ is only a semimeasure.
ξ(y˙c˙1...y˙1) > ξ(y˙1c˙1...(1−y˙k)1)
×
> 2−K(δy˙1c˙1 ...δ(1−y˙k)1∗) =
= 2−K(z˙1...z˙k∗) > 2−K(z˙)−O(1) =: α
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In the first inequality we have used the fact that y˙k maximizes by definition (48) the
argument, i.e. 1− y˙k has lower probability than y˙k. (49) has been applied in the second
inequality. The equality holds, because z˙i= δy˙ic˙i and δ(1−y˙k)1= δy˙k0= δy˙k c˙k = z˙k. The last
inequality follows from the definition of z˙.
We have shown that each erroneous prediction reduces ξ˙ by at least the α defined above.
Together with ξ˙0=1 and ξ˙k>0 for all k this shows that the system can make at most 1/α
errors, since otherwise ξ˙k would become negative. So the number of wrong predictions
EAInξ of system (48) is bounded by
EAInξ <
1
α
= 2K(z˙)+O(1) < ∞ (50)
for a computable deterministic environment string z˙1z˙2.... The intuitive interpretation is
that each wrong prediction eliminates at least one program p of size l(p)
+
<K(z˙). The
size is smaller than K(z˙), as larger policies could not mislead the system to a wrong
prediction, since there is a program of size K(z˙) making a correct prediction. There are
at most 2K(z˙)+O(1) such policies, which bounds the total number of errors.
We have derived a finite bound for EAInξ , but unfortunately, a rather weak one as compared
to (22). The reason for the strong bound in the SP case was that every error at least
halves ξ˙ because the sum of the maxargxk arguments was 1. Here we have
ξ(y˙1c˙1...y˙k−1c˙k−100) + ξ(y˙1c˙1...y˙k−1c˙k−101) = 1
ξ(y˙1c˙1...y˙k−1c˙k−110) + ξ(y˙1c˙1...y˙k−1c˙k−111) = 1
but maxargyk runs over the right top and right bottom ξ, for which no sum criterion
holds.
The AIξ model would not be sufficient for realistic applications if the bound (50) were
sharp, but we have the strong feeling (but only weak arguments) that better bounds pro-
portional to K(z˙) analog to (22) exist. The technique used above may not be appropriate
for achieving this. One argument for a better bound is the formal similarity between
maxargzk(z˙<kzk) and (48), the other is that we were unable to construct an example
sequence for which (48) makes more than O(K(z˙)) errors.
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6 Strategic Games (SG)
Introduction: A very important class of problems are strategic games, like chess. In
fact, what is subsumed under game theory nowadays, is so general, that it includes not
only a huge variety of games, from simple games of chance like roulette, combined with
strategy like Backgammon, up to purely strategic games like chess or checkers or go.
Game theory can also describe political and economic competitions and coalitions, even
Darwinism and many more have been modeled within game theory. It seems that nearly
every AI problem could be brought into the form of a game. Nevertheless, the intention of
a game is that several players perform some actions with (partial) observable consequences.
The goal of each player is to maximize some utility function (e.g. to win the game). The
players are assumed to be rational, taking into account all information they posses. The
different goals of the players are usually in conflict. For an introduction into game theory,
see [10, 26, 31, 40].
If we interpret the AI system as one player and the environment models the other ratio-
nal player and the environment provides the reinforcement feedback ck, we see that the
system-environment configuration satisfies all criteria of a game. On the other hand, we
know that the AI system can handle more general situations, since it interacts optimally
with an environment, even if the environment is not a rational player with conflicting
goals.
Strictly competitive strategic games: In the following, we restrict ourselves to de-
terministic, strictly competitive strategic16 games with alternating moves. Player 1 makes
move y′k in round k, followed by the move x
′
k of player 2. So a game with n rounds consists
of a sequence of alternating moves y′1x
′
1y
′
2x
′
2...y
′
nx
′
n. At the end of the game in cycle n the
game or final board state is evaluated with C(y′1x
′
1...y
′
nx
′
n). Player 1 tries to maximize
C, whereas player 2 tries to minimize C. In the simplest case, C is 1 if player 1 won the
game, C =−1 if player 2 won and C =0 for a draw. We assume a fixed game length n
independent of the actual move sequence. For games with variable length but maximal
possible number of moves n, we could add dummy moves and pad the length to n. The
optimal strategy (Nash equilibrium) of both players is a minimax strategy
x˙′k = minarg
x′
k
max
y′
k+1
min
x′
k+1
...max
y′n
min
x′n
C(y˙′1x˙
′
1...y˙
′
kx
′
k...y
′
nx
′
n) (51)
y˙′k = maxarg
y′
k
min
x′
k
...max
y′n
min
x′n
C(y˙′1x˙
′
1...y˙
′
k−1x˙
′
k−1y
′
kx
′
k...y
′
nx
′
n) (52)
But note, that the minimax strategy is only optimal if both players behave rationally.
If, for instance, player 2 has limited capabilites or makes errors and player 1 is able to
discover these (through past moves) he could exploit these and improve his performance
by deviating from the minimax strategy. At least, the classical game theory of Nash
equilibria does not take into account limited rationality, whereas the AIξ system should.
16In game theory, games like chess are often called ’extensive’, whereas ’strategic’ is reserved for a
different kind of game.
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Using the AIµ model for game playing: In the following, we demonstrate the
applicability of the AI model to games. The AI system takes the position of player 1.
The environment provides the evaluation C. For a symmetric situation we could take a
second AI system as player 2, but for simplicity we take the environment as the second
player and assume that this environmental player behaves according to the minimax
strategy (51). The environment serves as a perfect player and as a teacher, albeit a very
crude one as it tells the system at the end of the game, only whether it won or lost.
The minimax behaviour of player 2 can be expressed by a (deterministic) probability
distribution µSG as the following
µSG(y′1x
′
1...y
′
nx
′
n) :=


1 if x′k = minarg
x′′
k
...max
y′′n
min
x′′n
C(y′1...x
′
k−1y
′′
k ...x
′′
n) ∀ 1≤k≤n
0 otherwise
(53)
The probability that player 2 makes move x′k is µ
SG(y˙′1x˙
′
1...y˙
′
kx
′
k) which is 1 for x
′
k= x˙
′
k as
defined in (51) and 0 otherwise.
Clearly, the AI system receives no feedback, i.e. c1= ... = cn−1=0, until the end of the
game, where it should receive positive/negative/neutral feedback on a win/loss/draw, i.e.
cn = C(...). The environmental prior probability is therefore
µAI(y1x1...ynxn) =
{
µSG(y′1x
′
1...y
′
nx
′
n) if c1= ... =cn−1=0 and cn = C(y
′
1x
′
1...y
′
nx
′
n)
0 otherwise
(54)
where yi = y
′
i and xi = cix
′
i. If the environment is a minimax player (51) plus a crude
teacher C, i.e. if µAI is the true prior probability, the question now is, what is the
behaviour y˙AIk of the AIµ system. It turns out that if we set mk = n the AIµ system is
also a minimax player (52) and hence optimal
y˙AIk = maxarg
yk
∑
x′
k
...max
yn
∑
x′n
C(y˙x˙′<kyx
′
k:n)·µSG(y˙x˙′<kyx′k:n) =
= maxarg
yk
∑
x′
k
...max
yn−1
∑
x′
n−1
max
yn
min
x′n
C(y˙x˙′<kyx
′
k:n)·µSG(y˙x˙′<kyx′k:n−1) = (55)
= ... = maxarg
yk
min
x′
k+1
...max
yn
min
x′n
C(y˙x˙′<kyx
′
k:n) = y˙
SG
k
In the first line we inserted mk = n and (54) into the definition (9) of y˙
AI
k . This re-
moves all sums over the ck. Further, the sum over x
′
n gives only a contribution for
x′n=minargx′n C(x˙
′
1y˙
′
1...x
′
ny
′
n) by definition (53) of µ
SG. Inserting this x′n gives the second
line. µSG is effectively reduced to a lower number of arguments and the sum over x′n re-
placed by minx′n. Repeating this procedure for x
′
n−1, ..., x
′
k+1 leads to the last line, which
is just the minimax strategy of player 1 defined in (52).
Let us now assume that the game under consideration is played s times. The prior
probability then is
µAI(yx1...yxsn) =
s−1∏
r=0
µAI1 (yxrn+1...yx(r+1)n) (56)
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where we have renamed the prior probability (54) for one game to µAI1 . (56) is a special
case of a factorizable µ (15) with identical factors µr = µ
AI
1 for all r and equal episode
lengths nr+1−nr = n. The AIµ system (56) for repeated game playing also implements
the minimax strategy,
y˙AIk = maxarg
yk
min
x′
k
... max
y(r+1)n
min
x′
(r+1)n
C(y˙x˙′rn+1:k−1...yx
′
k:(r+1)n) (57)
with r such that rn<k≤ (r+1)n and for any choice of mk as long as the horizon hk≥n.
This can be proved by using (16) and (55). See section (4) for a discussion on separable
and factorizable µ.
Games of variable length: In the unrepeated case we have argued that games of
variable but bounded length can be padded to a fixed length without effect. We now
analyze in a sequence of games the effect of replacing the games with fixed length by
games of variable length. The sequence y′1x
′
1...y
′
nx
′
n can still be grouped into episodes
corresponding to the moves of separated consecutive games, but now the length and
total number of games that fit into the n moves depend on the actual moves taken17.
C(y′1x
′
1...y
′
nx
′
n) equals the number of games where the system wins, minus the number of
games where the environment wins. Whenever a loss, win or draw has been achieved by
the system or the environment, a new game starts. The player whose turn it would next
be, begins the next game. The games are still separated in the sense that the behaviour
and credit of the current game does not influence the next game. On the other hand,
they are slightly entangled, because the length of the current game determines the time
of start of the next. As the rules of the game are time invariant, this does not influence
the next game directly. If we play a fixed number of games, the games are completely
independent, but if we play a fixed number of total moves n, the number of games depends
on their lengths. This has the following consequences: the better player tries to keep the
games short, to win more games in the given time n. The poorer player tries to draw
the games out, in order loose less games. The better player might further prefer a quick
draw, rather than to win a long game. Formally, this entanglement is represented by the
fact that the prior probability µ does no longer factorize. The reduced form (57) of y˙AIk
to one episode is no longer valid. Also, the behaviour y˙AIk of the system depends on mk,
even if the horizon hk is chosen larger than the longest possible game (unless mk ≥ n).
The important point is that the system realizes that keeping games short/long can lead to
increased credit. In practice, a horizon much larger than the average game length should
be sufficient to incorporate this effect. The details of games in the distant future do not
affect the current game and can, therefore, be ignored. A more quantitative analysis could
be interesting, but would lead us too far astray.
Using the AIξ model for game playing: When going from the specific AIµ model,
where the rules of the game have been explicitly modeled into the prior probability µAI ,
to the universal model AIξ we have to ask whether these rules can be learned from the
17If the sum of game lengths do not fit exactly into n moves, we pad the last game appropriately.
6 STRATEGIC GAMES (SG) 37
assigned credits ck. Here, another (actually the main) reason for studying the case of
repeated games, rather than just one game arises. For a single game there is only one
cycle of non-trivial feedback namely the end of the game - too late to be useful except
when there are further games following.
Even in the case of repeated games, there is only very limited feedback, at most log2 3 bits
of information per game if the 3 outcomes win/loss/draw have the same frequency. So
there are at least O(K(game)) number of games necessary to learn a game of complexity
K(game). Apart from extremely simple games, even this estimate is far too optimistic.
As the AIξ system has no information about the game to begin with, its moves will be
more or less random and it can win the first few games merely by pure luck. So the
probability that the system looses is near to one and hence the information content I in
the feedback ck at the end of the game is much less than log2 3. This situation remains
for a very large number of games. On the other hand, in principle, every game should be
learnable after a very long sequence of games even with this minimal feedback only, as
long as I 6≡ 0.
The important point is that no other learning scheme with no extra information can learn
the game more quickly. We expect this to be true as µAI factorizes in the case of games of
fixed length, i.e. µAI satisfies a strong separability condition. In the case of variable game
length the entanglement is also low. µAI should still be sufficiently separable allowing to
formulate and prove good credit bounds for AIξ.
To learn realistic games like tic-tac-toe (noughts and crosses) in realistic time one has to
provide more feedback. This could be achieved by intermediate help during the game. The
environment could give positive(negative) feedback for every good(bad) move the system
makes. The demand on whether a move is to be valued as good should be adopted to the
gained experience of the system in such a way that approximately half of the moves are
valuated as good and the other half as bad, in order to maximize the information content
of the feedback.
For more complicated games like chess, even more feedback is necessary from a practical
point of view. One way to increase the feedback far beyond a few bits per cycle is to train
the system by teaching it good moves. This is called supervised learning. Despite the fact
that the AI model has only a credit feedback ck, it is able to learn by teaching, as will be
shown in section 8. Another way would be to start with more simple games containing
certain aspects of the true game and to switch to the true game when the system has
learned the simple game.
No other difficulties are expected when going from µ to ξ. Eventually ξAI will converge
to the minimax strategy µAI . In the more realistic case, where the environment is not a
perfect minimax player, AIξ can detect and exploit the weakness of the opponent.
Finally, we want to comment on the input/output space X/Y of the AI system. In
practical applications, Y will possibly include also illegal moves. If Y is the set of moves
of e.g. a robotic arm, the system could move a wrong figure or even knock over the figures.
A simple way to handle illegal moves yk is by interpreting them as losing moves, which
terminate the game. Further, if e.g. the input xk is the image of a video camera which
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makes one shot per move, X is not the set of moves by the environment but includes the
set of states of the game board. The discussion in this section handles this case as well.
There is no need to explicitly design the systems I/O space X/Y for a specific game.
The discussion above on the AIξ system was rather informal for the following reason:
game playing (the SGξ system) has (nearly) the same complexity as fully general AI, and
quantitative results for the AIξ system are difficult (but not impossible) to obtain.
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7 Function Minimization (FM)
Applications/Examples: There are many problems that can be reduced to a mini-
mization problem (FM). The minimum of a (real valued) function f :Y → IR over some
domain Y or a good approximate of it has to be found, usually with some limited re-
sources.
One popular example is the traveling salesman problem (TSP). Y is the set of different
routes between towns and f(y) the length of route y ∈Y . The task is to find a route of
minimal length visiting all cities. This problem is NP hard. Getting good approximations
in limited time is of great importance in various applications. Another example is the
minimization of production costs (MPC), e.g. of a car, under several constraints. Y
is the set of all alternative car designs and production methods compatible with the
specifications and f(y) the overall cost of alternative y∈Y . A related example is finding
materials or (bio)molecules with certain properties (MAT). E.g. solids with minimal
electrical resistance or maximally efficient chlorophyll modifications or aromatic molecules
that taste as close as possible to strawberry.We can also ask for nice paintings (NPT). Y
is the set of all existing or imaginable paintings and f(y) characterizes how much person
A likes painting y. The system should present paintings, which A likes.
For now, these are enough examples. The TSP is very rigorous from a mathematical
point of view, as f , i.e. an algorithm of f , is usually known. In principle, the minimum
could be found by extensive search, were it not for computational resource limitations.
For MPC, f can often be modeled in a reliable and sufficiently accurate way. For MAT
you need very accurate physical models, which might be unavailable or too difficult to
solve or implement. For NPT the most we have is the judgement of person A on every
presented painting. The evaluation function f cannot be implemented without scanning
A′s brain, which is not possible with todays technology.
So there are different limitations, some depending on the application we have in mind.
An implementation of f might not be available, f can only be tested at some arguments y
and f(y) is determined by the environment. We want to (approximately) minimize f with
as few function calls as possible or, conversely, find an as close as possible approximation
for the minimum within a fixed number of function evaluations. If f is available or can
quickly be inferred by the system and evaluation is quick, it is more important to minimize
the total time needed to imagine new trial minimum candidates plus the evaluation time
for f . As we do not consider computational aspects of AIξ till section 10 we concentrate
on the first case, where f is not available or dominates the computational requirements.
The Greedy Model FMGµ : The FM model consists of a sequence y˙1z˙1y˙2z˙2... where
y˙k is a trial of the FM system for a minimum of f and z˙k = f(y˙k) is the true function
value returned by the environment. We randomize the model by assuming a probability
distribution µ(f) over the functions. There are several reasons for doing this. We might
really not know the exact function f , as in the NPT example, and model our uncertainty
by the probability distribution µ. More importantly, we want to parallel the other AI
classes, like in the SPµ model, where we always started with a probability distribution µ
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that was finally replaced by ξ to get the universal Solomonoff prediction SPξ. We want to
do the same thing here. Further, the probabilistic case includes the deterministic case by
choosing µ(f)=δff0 , where f0 is the true function. A final reason is that the deterministic
case is trivial when µ and hence f0 is known, as the system can internally (virtually) check
all function arguments and output the correct minimum from the very beginning.
We will assume that Y is countable or finite and that µ is a discrete measure, e.g. by
taking only computable functions. The probability that the function values of y1, ..., yn
are z1, ..., zn is then given by
µFM(y1z1...ynzn) :=
∑
f :f(yi)=zi ∀1≤i≤n
µ(f) (58)
We start with a model that minimizes the expectation zk of the function value f for the
next output yk, taking into account previous information:
y˙k := minarg
yk
∑
zk
zk ·µ(y˙1z˙1...y˙k−1z˙k−1ykzk)
This type of greedy algorithm, just minimizing the next feedback, was sufficient for se-
quence prediction (SP) and is also sufficient for classification (CF). It is, however, not
sufficient for function minimization as the following example demonstrates.
Take f : {0, 1}→{1, 2, 3, 4}. There are 16 different functions which shall be equiprobable,
µ(f)= 1
16
. The function expectation in the first cycle
〈z1〉 :=
∑
z1
z1 ·µ(y1z1) = 14
∑
z1
z1 =
1
4
(1+2+3+4) = 2.5
is just the arithmetic average of the possible function values and is independent of y1.
Therefore, y˙1=0, as minarg is defined to take the lexicographically first minimum in an
ambiguous case. Let us assume that f0(0)=2, where f0 is the true environment function,
i.e. z˙1=2. The expectation of z2 is then
〈z2〉 :=
∑
z2
z2 ·µ(02y2z2) =
{
2 for y2 = 0
2.5 for y2 = 1
For y2 = 0 the system already knows f(0) = 2, for y2 = 1 the expectation is, again, the
arithmetic average. The system will again output y˙2=0 with feedback z˙2=2. This will
continue forever. The system is not motivated to explore other y′s as f(0) is already
smaller than the expectation of f(1). This is obviously not what we want. The greedy
model fails. The system ought to be inventive and try other outputs when given enough
time.
The general reason for the failure of the greedy approach is that the information contained
in the feedback zk depends on the output yk. A FM system can actively influence the
knowledge it receives from the environment by the choice in yk. It may be more advanta-
geous to first collect certain knowledge about f by an (in greedy sense) non-optimal choice
for yk, rather than to minimize the zk expectation immediately. The non-minimality of
zk might be over-compensated in the long run by exploiting this knowledge. In SP, the
received information is always the current bit of the sequence, independent of what SP
predicts for this bit. This is the reason why a greedy strategy in the SP case is already
optimal.
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The general FMµ/ξ Model: To get a useful model we have to think more carefully
about what we really want. Should the FM system output a good minimum in the last
output in a limited number of cycles T , or should the average of the z1, ..., zT values be
minimal, or does it suffice that just one of the z is as small as possible? Let us define the
FMµ model as to minimize the µ averaged weighted sum α1z1+ ...+αT zT for some given
αk≥0. Building the µ average by summation over the zi and minimizing w.r.t. the yi has
to be performed in the correct chronological order. With a similar reasoning as in (5) to
(9) we get
y˙FMk = minarg
yk
∑
zk
...min
yT
∑
zT
(α1z1+ ...+αT zT )·µ(y˙1z˙1...y˙k−1z˙k−1ykzk...yT zT ) (59)
If we want the final output y˙T to be optimal we should choose αk = 0 for k < T and
αT = 1 (final model FMFµ). If we want to already have a good approximation during
intermediate cycles, we should demand that the output of all cycles together are optimal
in some average sense, so we should choose αk = 1 for all k (sum model FMSµ). If
we want to have something in between, for instance, increase the pressure to produce
good outputs, we could choose the αk = e
γ(k−T ) exponentially increasing for some γ > 0
(exponential model FMEµ). For γ→∞ we get the FMFµ, for γ→0 the FMSµ model. If
we want to demand that the best of the outputs y1...yk is optimal, we must replace the α
weighted z-sum by min{z1, ..., zT} (minimum Model FMMµ). We expect the behaviour
to be very similar to the FMFµ model, and do not consider it further.
By construction, the FMµ models guarantee optimal results in the usual sense that no
other model knowing only µ can be expected to produce better results. The variety of
FM variants is not a fault of the theory. They just reflect the fact that there is some
interpretational freedom of what is meant by minimization within T function calls. In
most applications, probably FMF is appropriate. In the NPT application one might prefer
the FMS model.
The interesting case (in AI) is when µ is unknown. We define for this case, the FMξ model
by replacing µ(f) with some ξ(f), which should assign high probability to functions f of
low complexity. So we might define18 ξ(f)=
∑
q:∀x[U(qx)=f(x)] 2
−l(q). The problem with this
definition is that it is, in general, undecidable whether a TM q is an implementation of
a function f . ξ(f) defined in this way is uncomputable, not even approximable. As we
only need a ξ analog to the l.h.s. of (58), the following definition is natural
ξFM(y1z1...ynzn) :=
∑
q:q(yi)=zi ∀1≤i≤n
2−l(q) (60)
ξFM is actually equivalent to inserting the incomputable ξ(f) into (58). ξFM is an enu-
merable semi-measure and universal, relative to all probability distributions of the form
(58). We will not prove this here.
Alternatively, we could have constrained the sum in (60) by q(y1...yn)=z1...zn analog to
(24), but these two definitions are not equivalent. Definition (60) ensures the symmetry19
18ξFM (f) is a true probability distribution if we include partial functions in the domain. So normal-
ization is not necessary.
19See [39] for a discussion on symmetric universal distributions on unordered data.
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in its arguments and ξFM(...yz...yz′...)=0 for z 6= z′. It incorporates all general knowledge
we have about function minimization, whereas (24) does not. But this extra knowledge
has only low information content (complexity of O(1)), so we do not expect FMξ to
perform much worse when using (24) instead of (60). But there is no reason to deviate
from (60) at this point.
We can now define an ”error” measure EFMTµ as (59) with k=1 and minargy1 replaced by
miny1 and, additionally, µ replaced by ξ for E
FM
Tξ . We expect |EFMTξ −EFMTµ | to be bounded
in a way that justifies the use of ξ instead of µ for computable µ, i.e. computable f0 in
the deterministic case. The arguments are the same as for the AIξ model.
Is the general model inventive? In the following we will show that FMξ will never
cease searching for minima, but will test an infinite set of different y′s for T→∞.
Let us assume that the system tests only a finite number of yi∈A⊂ Y , |A|<∞. Let t−1
be the cycle in which the last new y∈A is selected (or some later cycle). Selecting y′s in
cycles k≥t a second time, the feedback z does not provide any new information, i.e. does
not modify the probability ξFM . The system can minimize EFMTξ by outputting in cycles
k ≥ t the best y∈A found so far (in the case αk=0, the output does not matter). Let us
fix f for a moment. Then we have
Ea := α1z1+ ... +αTzT =
t−1∑
k=1
αkf(yk) + f1 ·
T∑
k=t
αk , f1 := min
1≤k<t
f(yk)
Let us now assume that the system tests one additional yt 6∈A in cycle t, but no other
y 6∈ A. Again, it will keep to the best output for k > t, which is either the one of the
previous system or yt.
Eb =
t∑
k=1
αkf(yk) + min{f1, f(yt)}·
T∑
k=t+1
αk
The difference can be represented in the form
Ea −Eb =
(
T∑
k=t
αk
)
·f+ − αt ·f− , f± := max{0,±(f1−f(yt))} ≥ 0
As the true FMξ strategy is the one which minimizes E, assumption a is ruled out if
Ea > Eb. We will say that b is favored over a, which does not mean that b is the correct
strategy, only that a is not the true one. For probability distributed f , b is favored over
a when
Ea − Eb =
(
T∑
k=t
αk
)
·〈f+〉 − αt ·〈f−〉 > 0 ⇔
T∑
k=t
αk > αt
〈f−〉
〈f+〉
where 〈f±〉 is the ξ expectation of ±f1∓f(yt) under the condition that ±f1≥±f(yt) and
under the constrains imposed in cycles 1...t−1. As ξ assigns a strictly positive probability
7 FUNCTION MINIMIZATION (FM) 43
to every non-empty event, 〈f+〉 6=0. Inserting αk= eγ(k−T ), assumption a is ruled out in
model FMEξ if
T−t > 1
γ
ln
[
1 +
〈f−〉
〈f+〉(e
γ − 1)
]
−1 →
{
0 for γ →∞ (FMFξ model)
〈f−〉/〈f+〉 − 1 for γ → 0 (FMSξ model)
We see that if the condition is not satisfied for some t, it will remain wrong for all t′>t.
So the FMFξ system will test each y only once up to a point from which on it always
outputs the best found y. Further, for T→∞ the condition always gets satisfied. As this
is true for any finite A, the assumption of a finite A is wrong. For T→∞ the system tests
an increasing number of different y′s, provided Y is infinite. The FMFξ model will never
repeat any y except in the last cycle T where it chooses the best found y. The FMSξ
model will test a new yt for fixed T , only if the expected value of f(yt) is not too large.
The above does not necessarily hold for different choices of αk. The above also holds for
the FMFµ system if 〈f+〉 6= 0. 〈f+〉 = 0 if the system can already exclude that yt is a
better guess, so there is no reason to test it explicitly.
Nothing has been said about the quality of the guesses, but for the FMµ system they are
optimal by definition. If K(µ) for the true distribution µ is finite, we expect the FMξ
system to solve the ”exploration versus exploitation” problem in a universally optimal
way, as ξ converges to µ.
Using the AI models for Function Mininimization: The AI model can be used
for function minimization in the following way. The output yk of cycle k is a guess for
a minimum of f , like in the FM model. The credit ck should be high for small function
values zk=f(yk). The credit should also be weighted with αk to reflect the same strategy
as in the FM case. The choice of ck=−αkzk is natural. Here, the feedback is not binary
but ck ∈ C ⊂ IR, with C being a countable subset of IR, e.g. the computable reals or
all rational numbers. The feedback x′k should be the function value f(yk). So we set
x′k = zk. Note, that there is a redundancy if α() is a computable function with no zeros,
as ck= −αkx′k. So, for small K(α()) like in the FMS model, one might set xk ≡ ǫ. If we
keep x′k the AI prior probability is
µAI(y1x1...ynxn) =
{
µFM(y1z1...ynzn) for ck = −αkzk, x′k = zk, xk = ckx′k
0 else.
(61)
Inserting this into (9) with mk = T we get
y˙AIk = maxarg
yk
∑
xk
...max
yT
∑
xT
(ck+ ...+cT )·µAI(y˙1x˙1...ykxk...yTxT ) =
= minarg
yk
∑
zk
...min
yT
∑
zT
(αkzk+ ...+αT zT )·µFM(y˙1z˙1...ykzk...yTzT ) = y˙FMk
where y˙FMk has been defined in (59). The proof of equivalence was so simple because the
FM model has already a rather general structure, which is similar to the full AI model.
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One might expect no problems when going from the already very general FMξ model to
the universal AIξ model (with mk = T ), but there is a pitfall in the case of the FMF
model. All credits ck are zero in this case, except for the last one being cT . Although
there is a feedback zk in every cycle, the AIξ system cannot learn from this feedback as
it is not told that in the final cycle cT will equal to −zT . There is no problem in the FMξ
model because in this case this knowledge is hardcoded into ξFM . The AIξ model must
first learn that it has to minimize a function but it can only learn if there is a non-trivial
credit assignment ck. FMF works for repeated minimization of (different) functions, such
as minimizing N functions in N ·T cycles. In this case there are N non-trivial feedbacks
and AIξ has time to learn that there is a relation between ck·T and x′k·T every T
th cycle.
This situation is similar to the case of strategic games discussed in section 6.
There is no problem in applying AIξ to FMS because the c feedback provides enough
information in this case. The only thing the AIξ model has to learn, is to ignore the x
feedbacks as all information is already contained in c. Interestingly the same argument
holds for the FME model if K(γ) and K(T ) are small20. The AIξ model has additionally
only to learn the relation ck =−e−γ(k−T )x′k. This task is simple as every cycle provides
one data point for a simple function to learn. This argument is no longer valid for γ→∞
as K(γ)→∞ in this case.
Remark: TSP seems to be trivial in the AIµ model but non-trivial in the AIξ model.
The reason being that (59) just implements an internal complete search as µ(f)=δffTSP
contains all necessary information. AIµ outputs from the very beginning, the exact mini-
mum of fTSP . This ”solution” is, of course, unacceptable from performance perspective.
As long as we give no efficient approximation ξc of ξ, we have not contributed anything
to a solution of the TSP by using AIξc. The same is true for any other problem where f
is computable and easily accessible. Therefore, TSP is not (yet) a good example because
all we have done is to replace a NP complete problem with the uncomputable AIξ model
or by a computable AIξc model, for which we have said nothing about computation time
yet. It is simply an overkill to reduce simple problems to AIξ. TSP is a simple problem in
this respect, until we consider the AIξc model seriously. For the other examples, where f
is inaccessible or complicated, AIξc provides a true solution to the minimization problem
as an explicit definition of f is not needed for AIξ and AIξc.
20If we set αk = e
γk the condition on K(T ) can be dropped.
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8 Supervised Learning by Examples (EX)
The AI models provide a frame for reinforcement learning. The environment provides a
feedback c, informing the system about the quality of its last output y; it assigns credit
c to output y. In this sense, reinforcement learning is explicitly integrated into the AIρ
model. For ρ = µ it maximizes the true expected credit, whereas the AIξ model is a
universal, environment independent, reinforcement learning algorithm.
There is another type of learning method: Supervised learning by presentation of examples
(EX). Many problems learned by this method are association problems of the following
type. Given some examples x∈R ⊂X, the system should reconstruct, from a partially
given x′, the missing or corrupted parts, i.e. complete x′ to x such that relation R contains
x. In many cases, X consists of pairs (z, v), where v is the possibly missing part.
Applications/Examples: Learning functions by presenting (z, f(z)) pairs and asking
for the function value of z by presenting (z, ?) also falls into this category.
A basic example is learning properties of geometrical objects coded in some way. E.g. if
there are 18 different objects characterized by their size (small or big), their colors (red,
green or blue) and their shapes (square, triange, circle), then (object, property)∈R if the
object possesses the property. Here, R is a relation which is not the graph of a single
valued function.
When teaching a child, by pointing to objects and saying ”this is a tree” or ”look how
green” or ”how beautiful”, one establishes a relation of (object, property) pairs in R.
Pointing to a (possibly different) tree later and asking ”what is this ?” corresponds to a
partially given pair (object, ?), where the missing part ”?” should be completed by the
child saying ”tree”.
A final example we want to give is chess. We have seen that, in principle, chess can be
learned by reinforcement learning. In the extreme case the environment only provides
credit c = 1 when the system wins. The learning rate is completely inacceptable from
a practical point of view. The reason is the very low amount of information feedback.
A more practical method of teaching chess is to present example games in the form of
sensible (board-state,move) sequences. They contain information about legal and good
moves (but without any explanation). After several games have been presented, the
teacher could ask the system to make its own move by presenting (board-state, ?) and
then evaluate the answer of the system.
Supervised learning with the AIµ/ξ model: Let us define the EX model as follows:
The environment presents inputs x′k = zkvk ≡ (zk, vk) ∈ R∪(Z×{?}) ⊂ Z×(Y ∪{?}) = X ′
to the system in cycle k. The system is expected to output yk+1 in the next cycle, which
is evaluated with ck+1 = 1 if (zk, yk+1) ∈R and 0 otherwise. To simplify the discussion,
an output yk is expected and evaluated even when vk( 6=?) is given. To complete the
description of the environment, the probability distribution µR(x
′
1...x
′
n) of the examples
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x′i (depending on R) has to be given. Wrong examples should not occur, i.e. µR should
be 0 if x′i 6∈R for some 1≤ i≤ n. The relations R might also be probability distributed
with σ(R). The example prior probability in this case is
µ(x′1...x
′
n) =
∑
R
µR(x
′
1...x
′
n)·σ(R) (62)
The knowledge of the valuation ck on output yk restricts the possible relations R, consis-
tent with R(zk, yk+1) = ck+1, where R(z, y) := 1 if (z, y)∈R and 0 otherwise. The prior
probability for the input sequence x1...xn if the output sequence is y1...yn, is therefore
µAI(y1x1...ynxn) =
∑
R:∀1≤i<n[R(zi,yi+1)=ci+1]
µR(x
′
1...x
′
n)·σ(R)
where xi = cix
′
i and x
′
i−1 = zivi with vi ∈ Y ∪{?}. In the I/O sequence y1x1y2x2... =
y1c1z2v2y2c2z3v3... the c1y1 are dummies, after which regular behaviour starts.
The AIµ model is optimal by construction of µAI . For computable prior µR and σ, we
expect a near optimal behavior of the universal AIξ model if µR additionally satisfies
some separability property. In the following, we give some motivation why the AIξ model
takes into account the supervisor information contained in the examples and why it learns
faster than by reinforcement.
We keep R fixed and assume µR(x
′
1...x
′
n)=µR(x
′
1)· ... ·µR(x′n) 6=0⇔ x′i∈R∪(Z×{?}) ∀i to
simplify the discussion. Short codes q contribute mostly to ξAI(y1x1...ynxn). As x
′
1...x
′
n
is distributed according to the computable probability distribution µR, a short code of
x′1...x
′
n for large enough n is a Huffman coding w.r.t. the distribution µR. So we expect µR
and hence R coded in the dominant contributions to ξAI in some way, where the plausible
assumption was made that the y on the input tape do not matter. Much more than one
bit per cycle will usually be learned, hence, relation R can be learned in n≪K(R) cycles
by appropriate examples. This coding of R in q evolves independently of the feedbacks c.
To maximize the feedback ck, the system has to learn to output a yk+1 with (zk, yk+1)∈R.
The system has to invent a program extension q′ to q, which extracts zk from xk = zkvk
and searches for and outputs a yk+1 with (zk, yk+1)∈R. As R is already coded in q, q′ can
re-use this coding of R in q. The size of the extension q′ is, therefore, of O(1). To learn
this q′, the system requires feedback c with information content of O(1)=K(q′) only.
Let us compare this with reinforcement learning, where only x′k = (zk, ?) pairs are pre-
sented. A coding of R in a short code q for x′1...x
′
n is of no use and will therefore be absent.
Only the credits c force the system to learn R. q′ is therefore expected to be of size K(R).
The information content in the c′s must be of the order K(R). In practice, there are
often only very few ck = 1 at the beginning of the learning phase and the information
content in c1...cn is much less than n bits. The required number of cycles to learn R by
reinforcement is, therefore, at least but in many cases much larger than K(R).
Although AIξ was never designed or told to learn supervised, it learns how to take advan-
tage of the examples from the supervisor. µR and R are learned from the examples, the
credits c are not necessary for this process. The remaining task of learning how to learn
supervised is then a simple task of complexity O(1), for which the credits c are necessary.
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9 Other AI Classes
Other aspects of intelligence: In AI, a variety of general ideas and methods have
been developed. In the last sections, we have seen how several problem classes can be
formulated within AIξ. As we claim universality of the AIξ model, we want to enlight
which of, and how the other AI methods are incorporated in the AIξ model, by looking
its structure. Some methods are directly included, others are or should be emergent. We
do not claim the following list to be complete.
Probability theory and utility theory are the heart of the AIµ/ξ models. The probabilities
are the true/universal behaviours of the environment. The utility function is what we
called total credit, which should be maximized. Maximization of an expected utility
function in a probabilistic environment is usually called sequential decision theory, and
is explicitly integrated in full generality in our model. This includes probabilistic (a
generalization of deterministic) reasoning, where the object of reasoning are not true
or false statements, but the prediction of the environmental behaviour. Reinforcement
Learning is explicitly built in, due to the credits. Supervised learning is an emergent
phenomenon (section 8). Algorithmic information theory leads us to use ξ as a universal
estimate for the prior probability µ.
For horizon > 1, the alternative series of expectimax series in (16) and the process of
selecting maximal values can be interpreted as abstract planning. This expectimax series
also includes informed search, in the case of AIµ, and heuristic search, for AIξ, where
ξ could be interpreted as a heuristic for µ. The minimax strategy of game playing in
case of AIµ is also subsumed. The AIξ model converges to the minimax strategy if the
environment is a minimax player but it can also take advantage of environmental players
with limited rationality. Problem solving occurs (only) in the form of how to maximize
the expected future credit.
Knowledge is accumulated by AIξ and is stored in some form not specified further on the
working tape. Any kind of information in any representation on the inputs y is exploited.
The problem of knowledge engineering and representation appears in the form of how to
train the AIξ model. More practical aspects, like language or image processing have to
be learned by AIξ from scratch.
Other theories, like fuzzy logic, possibility theory, Dempster-Shafer theory, ... are partly
outdated and partly reducible to Bayesian probability theory [6]. The interpretation and
effects of the evidence gap g := 1−∑xk ξ(yx<kyxk) > 0 in ξ may be similar to those in
Dempster-Shafer theory. Boolean logical reasoning about the external world plays, at
best, an emergent role in the AIξ model.
Other methods, which don’t seem to be contained in the AIξ model might also be emergent
phenomena. The AIξ model has to construct short codes of the environmental behaviour,
the AIξ t˜l˜ (see next section) has to construct short action programs. If we would analyze
and interpret these programs for realistic environments, we might find some of the un-
mentioned or unused or new AI methods at work in these algorithms. This is, however,
pure speculation at this point. More important: when trying to make AIξ practically
usable, some other AI methods, like genetic algorithms or neural nets, may be useful.
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The main thing we wanted to point out is that the AIξ model does not lack any important
known property of intelligence or known AI methodology. What is missing, however, are
computational aspects, which are addressed, in the next section.
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10 Time Bounds and Effectiveness
Introduction: Until now, we have not bothered with the non-computability of the
universal probability distribution ξ. As all universal models in this paper are based on
ξ, they are not effective in this form. In this section, We will outline how the previous
models and results can be modified/generalized to the time-bounded case. Indeed, the
situation is not as bad as it could be. ξ and C are enumerable and y˙k is still approximable
or computable in the limit. There exists an algorithm, that will produce a sequence of
outputs eventually converging to the exact output y˙k, but we can never be sure whether
we have already reached it. Besides this, the convergence is extremely slow, so this
type of asymptotic computability is of no direct (practical) use, but will nevertheless, be
important later.
Let p˜ be a program which calculates within a reasonable time t˜ per cycle, a reasonable
intelligent output, i.e. p˜(x˙<k)= y˙1:k. This sort of computability assumption, that a general
purpose computer of sufficient power is able to behave in an intelligent way, is the very
basis of AI, justifying the hope to be able to construct systems which eventually reach
and outperform human intelligence. For a contrary viewpoint see [28]. It is not necessary
to discuss here, what is meant by ’reasonable time/intelligence’ and ’sufficient power’.
What we are interested in, in this section, is whether there is a computable version AIξ t˜
of the AIξ system which is superior or equal to any p with computation time per cycle
of at most t˜. With ’superior’, we mean ’more intelligent’, so what we need is an order
relation (like) (39) for intelligence.
The best result we could think of would be an AIξ t˜ with computation time ≤ t˜ at least
as intelligent as any p with computation time ≤ t˜. If AI is possible at all, we would have
reached the final goal, the construction of the most intelligent algorithm with computation
≤ t˜. Just as there is no universal measure in the set of computable measures (within time
t˜), such an AIξt may neither exist.
What we can realistically hope to construct, is an AIξ t˜ system of computation time c·˜t per
cycle for some constant c. The idea is to run all programs p of length ≤ l˜ := l(p˜) and time
≤ t˜ per cycle and pick the best output. The total computation time is 2l˜ · t˜, hence c = 2l˜.
This sort of idea of ’typing monkeys’ with one of them eventually writing Shakespeare,
has been applied in various forms and contexts in theoretical computer science. The
realization of this best vote idea, in our case, is not straightforward and will be outlined
in this section. An idea related to this, is that of basing the decision on the majority of
algorithms. This ’democratic vote’ idea has been used in [20, 42] for sequence prediction,
and is referred to as ’weighted majority’ there.
Time limited probability distributions: In the literature one can find time limited
versions of Kolmogorov complexity [8, 16] and the time limited universal semimeasure
[21, 24]. In the following, we utilize and adapt the latter and see how far we get. One
way to define a time-limited universal chronological semimeasure is as a sum over all
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enumerable chronological semimeasures computable within time t˜ and of size at most l˜
similar to the unbounded case (27).
ξ t˜l˜(yx1:n) :=
∑
ρ : l(ρ)≤l˜ ∧ t(ρ)≤t˜
2−l(ρ)ρ(yx1:n) (63)
Let us assume that the true environmental prior probability µAI is equal to or sufficiently
accurately approximated by a ρ with l(ρ)≤ l˜ and t(ρ)≤ t˜ with t˜ and l˜ of reasonable size.
There are several AI problems that fall into this class. In function minimization of section
7, the computation of f and µFM are usually feasible. In many cases, the sequences of
section 5 which should be predicted, can be easily calculated when µSP is known. In
a classifier problem, the probability distribution µCF , according to which examples are
presented, is, in many cases, also elementary. But not all AI problems are of this ’easy’
type. For the strategic games of section 6, the environment is usually, itself, a highly
complex strategic player with a difficult to calculate µSG that is difficult to calculate,
although one might argue that the environmental player may have limited capabilities
too. But it is easy to think of a difficult to calculate physical (probabilistic) environment
like the chemistry of biomolecules.
The number of interesting applications makes this restricted class of AI problems, with
time and space bounded environment µt˜l˜, worth being studied. Superscripts to a prob-
ability distribution except for ξ t˜l˜ indicate their length and maximal computation time.
ξ t˜l˜ defined in (63), with a yet to be determined computation time, multiplicatively domi-
nates all µt˜l˜ of this type. Hence, an AIξ t˜l˜ model, where we use ξ t˜l˜ as prior probability, is
universal, relative to all AIµt˜l˜ models in the same way as AIξ is universal to AIµ for all
enumerable chronological semimeasures µ. The maxargyk in (25) selects a yk for which
ξ t˜l˜ has the highest expected utility Ckmk , where ξ
t˜l˜ is the weighted average over the ρt˜l˜.
y˙AIξ
t˜l˜
k is determined by a weighted majority. We expect AIξ
t˜l˜ to outperform all (bounded)
AIρt˜l˜, analog to the unrestricted case.
In the following we analyze the computability properties of ξ t˜l˜ and AIξ t˜l˜, i.e. of y˙AIξ
t˜l˜
k .
To compute ξ t˜l˜ according to the definition (63) we have to enumerate all chronological
enumerable semimeasures ρt˜l˜ of length ≤ l˜ and computation time ≤ t˜. This can be done
similarly to the unbounded case (30-32). All 2l˜ enumerable functions of length ≤ l˜,
computable within time t˜ have to be converted to chronological probability distributions.
For this, one has to evaluate each function for |X| ·k different arguments. Hence, ξ t˜l˜ is
computable within time21 t(ξ t˜l˜(yx1:k)) =O(|X| ·k ·2l˜ · t˜). The computation time of y˙AIξ
t˜l˜
k
depends on the size of X, Y and mk. ξ
t˜l˜ has to be evaluated |Y |hk |X|hk times in (25). It
is possible to optimize the algorithm and perform the computation within time
t(y˙AIξ
t˜l˜
k ) = O(|Y |hk |X|hk ·2l˜ · t˜) (64)
per cycle. If we assume that the computation time of µt˜l˜ is exactly t˜ for all arguments,
the brute force time t¯ for calculating the sums and maxs in (9) is t¯(y˙AIµ
t˜l˜
k )≥|Y |hk|X|hk ·t˜.
21We assume that a TM can be simulated by another in linear time.
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Combining this with (64), we get
t(y˙AIξ
t˜l˜
k ) = O(2
l˜ · t¯(y˙AIµt˜l˜k ))
This result has the proposed structure, that there is a universal AIξ t˜l˜ system with com-
putation time 2l˜ times the computation time of a special AIµt˜l˜ system.
Unfortunately, the class of AIµt˜l˜ systems with brute force evaluation of y˙k, according to
(9) is completely uninteresting from a practical point of view. E.g. in the context of
chess, the above result says that the AIξ t˜l˜ is superior within time 2l˜ · t˜ to any brute force
minimax strategy of computation time t˜. Even if the factor of 2l˜ in computation time
would not matter, the AIξ t˜l˜ system is, nevertheless practically useless, as a brute force
minimax chess player with reasonable time t˜ is a very poor player.
Note, that in the case of sequence prediction (hk=1, |Y |= |X|=2) the computation time
of ρ coincides with that of y˙AIρk within a factor of 2. The class AIρ
t˜l˜ includes all non-
incremental sequence prediction algorithms of size ≤ l˜ and computation time ≤ t˜/2. With
non-incremental, we mean that no information of previous cycles is taken into account
for the computation of y˙k of the current cycle.
The shortcomings (mentioned and unmentioned ones) of this approach are cured in the
next subsection, by deviating from the standard way of defining a timebounded ξ as a
sum over functions or programs.
The idea of the best vote algorithm: A general cybernetic or AI system is a chrono-
logical program p(x<k) = y1:k. This form, introduced in section 2, is general enough to
include any AI system (and also less intelligent systems). In the following, we are inter-
ested in programs p of length ≤ l˜ and computation time ≤ t˜ per cycle. One important
point in the time-limited setting is that p should be incremental, i.e. when computing
yk in cycle k, the information of the previous cycles stored on the working tape can be
re-used. Indeed, there is probably no practically interesting, non-incremental AI system
at all.
In the following, we construct a policy p∗, or more precisely, policies p∗k for every cycle
k that outperform all time and length limited AI systems p. In cycle k, p∗k runs all 2
l˜
programs p and selects the one with the best output yk. This is a ’best vote’ type of
algorithm, as compared to the ’weighted majority’ like algorithm of the last subsection.
The ideal measure for the quality of the output would be the ξ expected credit
Ckm(p|y˙x˙<k) :=
∑
q∈Q˙k
2−l(q)Ckm(p, q) , Ckm(p, q) := c(x
pq
k ) + ...+ c(x
pq
m ) (65)
The program p which maximizes Ckmk should be selected. We have dropped the nor-
malization N unlike in (38), as it is independent of p and does not change the order
relation which we are solely interested in here. Furthermore, without normalization, Ckm
is enumerable, which will be important later.
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Extended chronological programs: In the (functional form of the) AIξ model it was
convenient to maximize Ckmk over all p∈ P˙k, i.e. all p consistent with the current history
y˙x˙<k. This was no restriction, because for every possibly inconsistent program p there
exists a program p′ ∈ P˙k consistent with the current history and identical to p for all
future cycles ≥k. For the time limited best vote algorithm p∗ it would be too restrictive
to demand p∈ P˙k. To prove universality, one has to compare all 2l˜ algorithms in every
cycle, not just the consistent ones. An inconsistent algorithm may become the best one
in later cycles. For inconsistent programs we have to include the y˙k into the input, i.e.
p(y˙x˙<k) = y
p
1:k with y˙i 6= ypi possible. For p ∈ P˙k this was not necessary, as p knows the
output y˙k ≡ ypk in this case. The cpqi in the definition of Ckm are the valuations emerging in
the I/O sequence, starting with y˙x˙<k (emerging from p
∗) and then continued by applying
p and q with y˙i :=y
p
i for i≥k.
Another problem is that we need Ckmk to select the best policy, but unfortunately Ckmk
is uncomputable. Indeed, the structure of the definition of Ckmk is very similar to that
of y˙k, hence a brute force approach to approximate Ckmk requires too much computation
time as for y˙k. We solve this problem in a similar way, by supplementing each p with a
program that estimates Ckmk by w
p
k within time t˜. We combine the calculation of y
p
k and
wpk and extend the notion of a chronological program once again to
p(y˙x˙<k) = w
p
1y
p
1...w
p
ky
p
k (66)
with chronological order wp1y
p
1 y˙1x˙1w
p
2y
p
2 y˙2x˙2....
Valid approximations: p might suggest any output ypk but it is not allowed to rate it
with an arbitrarily high wpk if we want w
p
k to be a reliable criterion for selecting the best
p. We demand that no policy is allowed to claim that it is better than it actually is. We
define a (logical) predicate VA(p) called valid approximation, which is true if, and only if,
p always satisfies wpk≤Ckmk(p), i.e. never overrates itself.
VA(p) ≡ ∀k∀wp1yp1 y˙1x˙1...wpkypk : p(y˙x˙<k)=wp1yp1...wpkypk ⇒ wpk≤Ckmk(p|y˙x˙<k) (67)
In the following, we restrict our attention to programs p, for which VA(p) can be proved
in some formal axiomatic system. A very important point is that Ckmk is enumerable.
This ensures the existence of sequences of program p1, p2, p3, ... for which VA(pi) can be
proved and limi→∞w
pi
k =Ckmk(p) for all k and all I/O sequences. The approximation is
not uniform in k, but this does not matter as the selected p is allowed to change from
cycle to cycle.
Another possibility would be to consider only those p which check wpk ≤Ckmk(p) online
in every cycle, instead of the pre-check VA(p), either by constructing a proof (on the
working tape) for this special case, or it is already evident by the construction of wpk. In
cases where p cannot guarantee wpk≤Ckmk(p) it sets wk=0 and, hence, trivially satisfies
wpk≤Ckmk(p). On the other hand, for these p it is also no problem to prove VA(p) as one
has simply to analyze the internal structure of p and recognize that p shows the validity
internally itself, cycle by cycle, which is easy by assumption on p. The cycle by cycle
check is, therefore, a special case of the pre-proof of VA(p).
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Effective intelligence order relation: In section 4 we have introduced an intelligence
order relation  on AI systems, based on the expected credit Ckmk(p). In the following
we need an order relation c based on the claimed credit wpk which might be interpreted
as an approximation to . We call p effectively more or equally intelligent than p′ if
p c p′ :⇔ ∀k∀y˙x˙<k∃w1:nw′1:n :
p(y˙x˙<k)=w1∗ ...wk∗ ∧ p′(y˙x˙<k)=w′1∗ ...w′k∗ ∧ wk≥w′k (68)
i.e. if p always claims higher credit estimate w than p′. c is a co-enumerable partial
order relation on extended chronological programs. Restricted to valid approximations
it orders the policies w.r.t. the quality of their outputs and their ability to justify their
outputs with high wk.
The universal time bounded AIξ t˜l˜ system: In the following we, describe the algo-
rithm p∗ underlying the universal time bounded AIξ t˜l˜ system. It is essentially based on
the selection of the best algorithms p∗k out of the time t˜ and length l˜ bounded p, for which
there exists a proof of VA(p) with length ≤ lP .
1. Create all binary strings of length lP and interpret each as a coding of a mathe-
matical proof in the same formal logic system in which VA(·) has been formulated.
Take those strings which are proofs of VA(p) for some p and keep the corresponding
programs p.
2. Eliminate all p of length >l˜.
3. Modify all p in the following way: all output wpky
p
k is temporarily written on an
auxiliary tape. If p stops in t˜ steps the internal ’output’ is copied to the output
tape. If p does not stop after t˜ steps a stop is forced and wk=0 and some arbitrary
yk is written on the output tape. Let P be the set of all those modified programs.
4. Start first cycle: k :=1.
5. Run every p∈P on extended input y˙x˙<k, where all outputs are redirected to some
auxiliary tape: p(y˙x˙<k)=w
p
1y
p
1...w
p
ky
p
k.
6. Select the program p with highest claimed credit wpk: p
∗
k :=maxargpw
p
k.
7. Write y˙k :=y
p∗
k
k to the output tape.
8. Receive input x˙k from the environment.
9. Begin next cycle: k :=k+1, goto step 5.
It is easy to see that the following theorem holds.
Main theorem: Let p be any extended chronological (incremental) program like (66)
of length l(p)≤ l˜ and computation time per cycle t(p)≤ t˜, for which there exists a proof of
VA(p) defined in (67) of length ≤ lP . The algorithm p∗ constructed in the last subsection,
depending on l˜, t˜ and lP but not on p, is effectively more or equally intelligent, according
to c defined in (68) than any such p. The size of p∗ is l(p∗)=O(ln(l˜·t˜·lP )), the setup-time
is tsetup(p
∗)=O(lP ·2lP ), the computation time per cycle is tcycle(p∗)=O(2l˜ · t˜).
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Roughly speaking, the theorem says, that if there exists a computable solution to some
AI problem at all, the explicitly constructed algorithm p∗ is such a solution. Although
this theorem is quite general, there are some limitations and open questions which we
discuss in the following.
Limitations and open questions:
• Formally, the total computation time of p∗ for cycles 1...k increases linearly with
k, i.e. is of order O(k) with a coefficient 2l˜ · t˜. The unreasonably large factor 2l˜ is
a well known drawback in best/democratic vote models and will be taken without
further comments, whereas the factor t˜ can be assumed to be of reasonable size. If
we don’t take the limit k→∞ but consider reasonable k, the practical usefulness of
the timebound on p∗ is somewhat limited, due to the additional additive constant
O(lP ·2lP ). It is much larger than k ·2l˜ · t˜ as typically lP≫ l(VA(p))≥ l(p)≡ l˜.
• p∗ is superior only to those p which justify their outputs (by large wpk). It might be
possible that there are p which produce good outputs ypk within reasonable time, but
it takes an unreasonably long time to justify their outputs by sufficiently high wpk.
We do not think that (from a certain complexity level onwards) there are policies
where the process of constructing a good output is completely separated from some
sort of justification process. But this justification might not be translatable (at least
within reasonable time) into a reasonable estimate of Ckmk(p).
• The (inconsistent) programs p must be able to continue strategies started by other
policies. It might happen that a policy p steers the environment to a direction for
which it is specialized. A ’foreign’ policy might be able to displace p only between
loosely bounded episodes. There is probably no problem for factorizable µ. Think
of a chess game, where it is usually very difficult to continue the game/strategy of
a different player. When the game is over, it is usually advantageous to replace
a player by a better one for the next game. There might also be no problem for
sufficiently separable µ.
• There might be (efficient) valid approximations p for which VA(p) is true but not
provable, or for which only a very long (>lP ) proof exists.
Remarks:
• The idea of suggesting outputs and justifying them by proving credit bounds im-
plements one aspect of human thinking. There are several possible reactions to an
input. Each reaction possibly has far reaching consequences. Within a limited time
one tries to estimate the consequences as well as possible. Finally, each reaction is
valued and the best one is selected. What is inferior to human thinking is, that the
estimates wpk must be rigorously proved and the proofs are constructed by blind ex-
tensive search, further, that all behaviours p of length ≤ l˜ are checked. It is inferior
’only’ in the sense of necessary computation time but not in the sense of the quality
of the outputs.
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• In practical applications there are often cases with short and slow programs ps
performing some task T , e.g. the computation of the digits of π, for which there
also exist long and quick programs pl too. If it is not too difficult to prove that this
long program is equivalent to the short one, then it is possible to prove K(T )≤ l(ps)
within time t(pl). Similarly, the method of proving bounds wk for Ckmk can give
high lower bounds without explicitly executing these short and slow programs, which
mainly contribute to Ckmk .
• Dovetailing all length and time-limited programs is a well known elementary idea
(typing monkeys). The crucial part which has been developed here, is the selection
criterion for the most intelligent system.
• By construction of AIξ t˜l˜ and due to the enumerability of Ckmk , ensuring arbitrary
close approximations of Ckmk we expect that the behaviour of AIξ
t˜l˜ converges to the
behaviour of AIξ in the limit t˜, l˜→∞ in a sense.
• Depending on what you know/assume that a program p of size l˜ and computation
time per cycle t˜ is able to achieve, the computable AIξ t˜l˜ model will have the same
capabilities. For the strongest assumption of the existence of a Turing machine,
which outperforms human intelligence, the AIξ t˜l˜ will do too, within the same time
frame up to a (unfortunately very large) constant factor.
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11 Outlook & Discussion
This section contains some discussion of otherwise unmentioned topics and some (more
personal) remarks. It also serves as an outlook to further research.
Miscellaneous:
• In game theory [26] one often wants to model the situation of simultaneous actions,
whereas the AIξ models has serial I/O. Simultaneity can be simulated by withhold-
ing the environment from the current system’s output yk, until xk has been received
by the system. Formally, this means that ξ(yx<kyxk) is independent of yk. The AIξ
system is already of simultaneous type in an abstract view if the behaviour p is
interpreted as the action. In this sense, AIξ is the action p∗ which maximizes the
utility function (credit), under the assumption that the environment acts according
to ξ. The situation is different from game theory as the environment is not mod-
eled to be a second ’player’ that tries to optimize his own utility although it might
actually be a rational player (see section 6).
• In various examples we have chosen differently specialized input and output spaces
X and Y . It should be clear that, in principle, this is unnecessary, as large enough
spaces X and Y , e.g. 232 bit, serve every need and can always be Turing reduced to
the specific presentation needed internally by the AIξ system itself. But it is clear
that using a generic interface, such as camera and monitor for, learning tic-tac-toe
for example, adds the task of learning vision and drawing.
Outlook:
• Rigorous proofs for credit bounds are the major theoretical challenge are – general
ones as well as tighter bounds for special environments µ. Of special importance are
suitable (and acceptable) conditions to µ, under which y˙k and finite credit bounds
exist for infinite Y , X and mk.
• A direct implementation of the AIξ t˜l˜ model is ,at best, possible for toy environments
due to the large factor 2l˜ in computation time. But there are other applications
of the AIξ theory. We have seen in several examples how to integrate problem
classes into the AIξ model. Conversely, one can downscale the AIξ model by using
more restricted forms of ξ. This could be done in the same way as the theory
of universal induction has been downscaled with many insights to the Minimum
Description Length principle [22, 30] or to the domain of finite automata [9]. The AIξ
model might similarly serve as a super model or as the very definition of (universal
unbiased) intelligence, from which specialized models could be derived.
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• With a reasonable computation time, the AIξ model would be a solution of AI (see
next point if you disagree). The AIξ t˜l˜ model was the first step, but the elimination of
the factor 2l˜ without giving up universality will (almost certainly) be a very difficult
task. One could try to select programs p and prove VA(p) in a more clever way than
by mere enumeration, to improve performance without destroying universality. All
kinds of ideas like, genetic algorithms, advanced theorem provers and many more
could be incorporated. But now we are in trouble. We seem to have transferred
the AI problem just to a different level. This shift has some advantages (and also
some disadvantages) but presents, in no way, a solution. Nevertheless, we want
to stress that we have reduced the AI problem to (mere) computational questions.
Even the most general other systems the author is aware of, depend on some (more
than computational) assumptions about the environment or it is far from clear
whether they are, indeed, universal and optimal. Although computational questions
are themselves highly complicated, this reduction is a non-trivial result. A formal
theory of something, even if not computable, is often a great step toward solving a
problem and has also merits of its own, and AI should not be different (see previous
item).
• Many researchers in AI believe that intelligence is something complicated and cannot
be condensed into a few formulas. It is more a combining of enough methods and
much explicit knowledge in the right way. From a theoretical point of view, we
disagree as the AIξ model is simple and seems to serve all needs. From a practical
point of view we agree to the following extent. To reduce the computational burden
one should provide special purpose algorithms (methods) from the very beginning,
probably many of them related to reduce the complexity of the input and output
spaces X and Y by appropriate preprocessing methods.
• There is no need to incorporate extra knowledge from the very beginning. It can be
presented in the first few cycles in any format. As long as the algorithm to interpret
the data is of size O(1), the AIξ system will ’understand’ the data after a few cycles
(see section 8). If the environment µ is complicated but extra knowledge z makes
K(µ|z) small, one can show that the bound (20) reduces to 1
2
ln 2 ·K(µ|z) when
x1 ≡ z, i.e. when z is presented in the first cycle. The special purpose algorithms
could be presented in x1, too, but it would be cheating to say that no special purpose
algorithms had been implemented in AIξ. The boundary between implementation
and training is unsharp in the AIξ model.
• We have not said much about the training process itself, as it is not specific to the
AIξ model and has been discussed in literature in various forms and disciplines.
A serious discussion would be out of place. To repeat a truism, it is, of course,
important to present enough knowledge x′k and evaluate the system output yk with
ck in a reasonable way. To maximize the information content in the credit, one
should start with simple tasks and give positive reward ck=1 to approximately half
of the outputs yk.
11 OUTLOOK & DISCUSSION 58
The big questions: This subsection is devoted to the big questions of AI in general
and the AIξ model in particular with a personal touch.
• There are two possible objections to AI in general and, therefore, also against AIξ
in particular we want to comment on briefly. Non-computable physics (which is
not too weird) could make Turing computable AI impossible. As at least the world
that is relevant for humans seems mainly to be computable we do not believe that
it is necessary to integrate non-computable devices into an AI system. The (clever
and nearly convincing) ’Go¨del’ argument by Penrose [28] that non-computational
physics must exist and is relevant to the brain, has (in our opinion convincing)
loopholes.
• A more serious problem is the evolutionary information gathering process. It has
been shown that the ’number of wisdom’ Ω contains a very compact tabulation of
2n undecidable problems in its very first n binary digits [5]. Ω is only enumerable
with computation time increasing more rapidly with n, than any recursive function.
The enormous computational power of evolution could have developed and coded
something like Ω into our genes, which significantly guides human reasoning. In
short: Intelligence could be something complicated and evolution toward it from an
even cleverly designed algorithm of size O(1) could be too slow. As evolution has
already taken place, we could add the information from our genes or brain structure
to any/our AI system, but this means that the important part is still missing and
a simple formal definition of AI is principally impossible.
• For the probably biggest question about consciousness we want to give a physical
analogy. Quantum (field) theory is the most accurate and universal physical theory
ever invented. Although already developed in the 1930ies the big question regarding
the interpretation of the wave function collapse is still open. Although extremely
interesting from a philosophical point of view, it is completely irrelevant from a
practical point of view22. We believe the same to be true for consciousness in
the field of Artificial Intelligence. Philosophically highly interesting but practically
unimportant. Whether consciousness will be explained some day is another question.
22In the theory of everything, the collapse might become of ’practical’ importance and must or will be
solved.
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12 Conclusions
All tasks which require intelligence to be solved can naturally be formulated as a maxi-
mization of some expected utility in the framework of agents. We gave a functional (2) and
an iterative (9) formulation of such a decision theoretic agent, which is general enough to
cover all AI problem classes, as has been demonstrated by several examples. The main re-
maining problem is the unknown prior probability distribution µAI of the environment(s).
Conventional learning algorithms are unsuitable, because they can neither handle large
(unstructured) state spaces, nor do they converge in the theoretically minimal number
of cycles, nor can they handle non-stationary environments appropriately. On the other
hand, the universal semimeasure ξ (18), based on ideas from algorithmic information the-
ory, solves the problem of the unknown prior distribution for induction problems. No
explicit learning procedure is necessary, as ξ automatically converges to µ. We unified the
theory of universal sequence prediction with the decision theoretic agent by replacing the
unknown true prior µAI by an appropriately generalized universal semimeasure ξAI . We
gave strong arguments that the resulting AIξ model is the most intelligent, parameterless
and environmental/application independent model possible. We defined an intelligence
order relation (39) to give a rigorous meaning to this claim. Furthermore, possible solu-
tions to the horizon problem have been discussed. We outlined for a number of problem
classes in sections 5–8, how the AIξ model can solve them. They include sequence pre-
diction, strategic games, function minimization and, especially, how AIξ learns to learn
supervised. The list could easily be extended to other problem classes like classification,
function inversion and many others. The major drawback of the AIξ model is that it is
uncomputable, or more precisely, only asymptotically computable, which makes an im-
plementation impossible. To overcome this problem, we constructed a modified model
AIξ t˜l˜, which is still effectively more intelligent than any other time t˜ and space l˜ bounded
algorithm. The computation time of AIξ t˜l˜ is of the order t˜·2l˜. Possible further research has
been discussed. The main directions could be to prove general and special credit bounds,
use AIξ as a super model and explore its relation to other specialized models and finally
improve performance with or without giving up universality.
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